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Abstract
We introduce the notion of non-monotone utilities, which covers a wide variety of utility functions in
economic theory. We then prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute an approximate Arrow-Debreu market
equilibrium in markets with linear and non-monotone utilities. Building on this result, we settle the long-
standing open problem regarding the computation of an approximate Arrow-Debreu market equilibrium
in markets with CES utility functions, by proving that it is PPAD-complete when the Constant Elasticity
of Substitution parameter ρ is any constant less than −1.
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1 Introduction
General equilibrium theory [Deb59, Ell94] is regarded by many as the crown jewel of Mathematical Econo-
mics. It studies the interactions of price, demand and supply, and is established on the demand-equal-supply
principle of Walras [Wal74]. A remarkable market model central to this field is the one of Arrow and Debreu
[AD54], which has laid the foundation for competitive pricing mechanisms [AD54, Sca73].
In this model, traders exchange goods at a marketplace to maximize their utilities.1 Formally, an Arrow-
Debreu marketM consists of a set of traders and a set of goods, denoted by {G1, . . . , Gm} for somem ≥ 1.
Each trader has an initial endowmentw ∈ Rm+ , wherewj denotes the amount ofGj she brings to the market.
Each trader also has a real-valued utility function u. Given a bundle x ∈ Rm+ of goods, u(x) is her utility if
she obtains x after the exchange.
Now let pi ∈ Rm+ denote a price vector, where we use pij to denote the price of Gj . Each trader first sells
her endowment w at pi to obtain a budget of w ·pi. She then spends it to purchase a bundle of goods x from
the market to maximize her utility. We say pi is a market equilibrium of M if we can assign each trader an
optimal bundle with respect to pi such that the total demand equals the total supply and the market clears.
The celebrated theorem of Arrow and Debreu [AD54] asserts that, under mild conditions, every market
has an equilibrium. Their proof, however, is based on Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [Kak41] and is highly
non-constructive and non-algorithmic, given that no efficient general fixed-point algorithm is known so far.
Exponential lower bounds on the query complexity of a discrete fixed-point problem are proved for various
query models in [HPV89, CD08, CT07, CST08].
The problem of finding a market equilibrium was first studied in the pioneering work of Scarf [Sca73].
During the past decade, starting with the work of Deng, Papadimitriou, and Safra [DPS03], the computation
and approximation of equilibria have been studied intensively under various market models, and much pro-
gress has been made. This includes efficient algorithms for the market equilibrium problem [JMS03, DV03,
CDSY04, DV04, GK04, GKV04, CMV05, CMPV05, CPV05, JVY05, JM05, JV06, CHT06, Jai07, Ye07,
DK08, DPSV08, Ye08, Vaz10], many of which are based on the convex-programming approach of [EG59,
NP83]. Several complexity-theoretic results have also been obtained for various market models [CSVY06,
HT07, DD08, CDDT09, VY11, EY10, PW10, CT09, CT11].
Markets with CES Utilities
We study the complexity of approximating market equilibria in Arrow-Debreu markets with CES (constant
elasticity of substitution) utilities [MCWG95]. A CES utility function takes the following form:
u(x1, . . . , xm) =
 m∑
j=1
αj · xρj
1/ρ
where αj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m]; and the parameter ρ < 1 and ρ 6= 0. The family of CES utility functions was
first introduced in [Sol56, Dic54]. It was then used in [ACMS61] to model production functions and predict
economic growth. It has been one of the most widely used families of utility functions in economics litera-
ture [SW92, dLG09] due to their versatility and flexibility in economic modeling. For example, the popular
modeling language MPSGE [Rut99] for equilibrium analysis uses CES functions (and their generalization
to nested CES functions) to model consumption and production. The parameter ρ of a CES utility function
1The model of Arrow and Debreu also considers firms with production plans. Here we focus on the setting of exchange only.
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is related to the elasticity of substitution σ, a measure on how easy it is to substitute different goods or re-
sources [Hic32, Rob33] (namely ρ = (σ− 1)/σ). Selecting specific values for ρ between 1 and −∞ yields,
as special cases, various basic utility functions and models different points in the substitutes-complements
spectrum, ranging from the perfect substitutes case when ρ = 1, which corresponds to linear utilities, to the
intermediate case when ρ→ 0, which corresponds to the Cobb-Douglas utilities, to the perfect complements
case when ρ→ −∞, which corresponds to Leontief utilities.
Nenakov and Primak [NP83] gave a convex program that characterizes the set of equilibria when ρ = 1
i.e., all utility functions are linear. Jain [Jai07] discovered the same convex program independently and used
the ellipsoid algorithm to give a polynomial-time exact algorithm. It turns out that this convex program can
also be applied to characterize the set of equilibria in CES markets with ρ > 0. In [CMPV05], Codenotti,
McCune, Penumatcha, and Varadarajan gave a different convex formulation for the set of equilibria in CES
markets with ρ : −1 ≤ ρ < 0. The range of ρ < −1 however has remained an intriguing open problem. For
this range, it is known that the set of equilibria can be disconnected, and thus one cannot hope for a direct
convex formulation. An example can be found in [Gje96] with three isolated market equilibria.
The failure of the convex-programming approach seems to suggest that the problem might be hard. On
the other hand, as ρ → −∞, CES utilities converge to Leontief utilities for which finding an approximate
market equilibrium is known to be PPAD-hard [CSVY06]. This argument, however, is less compelling due
to the fact that a market with CES utilities converges to a Leontief market, as ρ→ −∞, does not mean that
the equilibria of the CES markets converge to an equilibrium of the Leontief market at the limit; actually it is
easy to find examples where this is not the case, and in fact it is possible that the CES markets have equilibria
that converge but the Leontief market at the limit does not even have any (approximate) equilibrium.
Moreover, with respect to the problem of determining whether a market equilibrium exists, CES utilities
do not behave like the Leontief limit but rather like those tractable utilities. Typically, the tractability of the
equilibrium existence problem conforms with that of the equilibrium computation problem (under standard
sufficient conditions for existence). For example, the existence problem for linear utilities can be solved in
polynomial time [Gal76] (as does the computation problem [Jai07]), and the same holds for Cobb-Douglas
utilities [Eav85], whereas the existence problem is NP-hard for Leontief utilities [CSVY06] and for sepa-
rable piecewise-linear utilities [VY11] (and their computation problem is PPAD-hard [CSVY06, CDDT09,
VY11]). However, it is known that the existence problem for CES functions is polynomial-time solvable for
all (finite) values of ρ [CMPV05]. This suggests that the equilibrium computation problem for CES utilities
might be also tractable.
The difficulty in resolving the complexity of the equilibrium computation problem for CES markets with
a constant ρ < −1 is mainly due to the continuous nature of the problem. Most, if not all, of the problems
shown to be PPAD-hard have a rich underlying combinatorial structure, whether it is to find an approximate
Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game [DGP09, CDT09] or to compute an approximate equilibrium in a
market with Leontief utilities [CSVY06] or with additively separable and concave piecewise-linear utilities
[CDDT09, VY11]. In contrast, given a price vector pi, the optimal bundle x of a CES trader is a continuous
function over pi, with an explicit algebraic form (see (1) in Section 2) which can be derived using the KKT
conditions. The problem of finding a market equilibrium now boils down to solving a system of polynomial
equations over variables pi, and it is not clear how to extract from it a useful combinatorial structure.
We settle the complexity of finding approximate equilibria in CES markets for all values of ρ < −1:
Theorem 1. For any fixed rational number ρ < −1, the problem of finding an approximate market equilib-
rium in a CES market of parameter ρ is PPAD-complete.
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It is worth pointing out that the notion of approximate market equilibria used in Theorem 1 is one-sided,
i.e., pi is an -approximate market equilibrium if the excess demand of each good is bounded from above by
-fraction of the total supply. While the two-sided notion of approximate equilibria is more commonly used
in the literature (which we will refer to as -tight approximate market equilibria), i.e., the absolute value of
excess demand is bounded, we present an unexpected CES market with ρ < 0 in Section 2.2 and prove that
any of its (1/2)-tight approximate equilibria requires exponentially many bits to represent. By contrast, we
show that for the one-sided notion there is always an -approximate equilibrium with a polynomial number
of bits and, furthermore, its computation is in PPAD. We show also that the problem of computing an actual
equilibrium (to any desired precision) is in FIXP.
PPAD-Hardness for Non-Monotone Families of Utilities
The resolution of the complexity of CES markets with ρ < −1 inspired us to ask the following question:
Can we prove a complexity dichotomy for any given family of utility functions?
Formulating it more precisely, we let U denote a generic family of utility functions that satisfy certain mild
conditions (e.g., they should be continuous, quasi-concave). The question now becomes the following:
Does there exist a mathematically well-defined property on families of functions such that:
For any U satisfying this property, the equilibrium problem it defines is in polynomial time;
For any U that violates this property, the problem is hard, e.g., PPAD-hard or even FIXP-hard.
For the algorithmic part of this question, a property that has played a critical role in the approximation
of market equilibria is WGS (Weak Gross Substitutability). A family U of utilities satisfies WGS if for any
market consisting of traders with utilities from U , increasing the price of one good while keeping all other
prices fixed cannot cause a decrease in the demand of any other good. WGS implies that the set of equilibria
form a convex set. In [ABH59], Arrow, Block and Hurwicz showed that, given any market satisfying WGS,
the continuous tatonnement process [Wal74, Sam47] converges. Recently in [CMV05], Codenotti, McCune
and Varadarajan showed that a discrete tatonnement algorithm converges to an approximate equilibrium in
polynomial time, if equipped with an excess demand oracle. Another general property that implies convex-
ity of the set of equilibria is WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference, see [MCWG95] for its definition
and background). While many families of utilities satisfy WGS or WARP, they do not seem to cover all the
efficiently solvable market problems, e.g., the family of CES utilities with parameter −1 ≤ ρ < 0 does not
satisfy WGS or WARP but has a convex formulation [CMPV05].
For the hardness part of this question, our knowledge is much more limited. Only for a few specific and
isolated families of utilities mentioned earlier, the problem of finding an approximate equilibrium is shown
to be hard. And the reduction techniques developed in these proofs are all different, each fine tuned for the
family of utilities being considered.
Our second contribution is a PPAD-hardness result that is widely applicable to any generic family U of
utility functions, as long as it satisfies the following condition:
[ Informal ]: There exists a market M with utilities from U , a special good G in M , and a
price vector pi such that at pi, the excess demand of G is nonnegative and raising the price
of G, while keeping all other prices the same, strictly increases the demand of G.
We call M a non-monotone market. We also call U a non-monotone family if such a market M exists.
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Examples of simple non-monotone markets, constructed from various families of utilities, can be found
in Section 2.3. We show that the existence of such a pair (M,pi) implies the following hardness result:
Theorem 2 (Informal). If U is non-monotone, then the following problem is PPAD-hard: Given a market
in which the utility of each trader is either linear or from U , find an approximate market equilibrium.
We remark that there is clearly a gap between WGS and non-monotonicity. It remains an open problem
as whether we can further reduce the gap and whether we can remove the use of linear functions.
The reductions for both of our main results are quite involved, and start from the problem of computing
a well-suported approximate equlibrium for a polymatrix game with 2 strategies per player, which we show
is PPAD-hard (the problem of finding an exact equilibrium was shown previously to be hard in [DGP09]).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give basic definitions and state formally
our main results. We provide also a very brief outline of the proofs. Section 3 contains the PPAD-hardness
proof for general non-monotone utilities (Theorem 2), and Section 4 contains the PPAD-hardness proof for
CES utilities (Theorem 1). Section 5 shows that the problem of computing an equilibrium for CES markets
is in FIXP, and Section 6 shows that computing an approximate equilibrium is in PPAD. Section 7 contains
the hardness proof of the polymatrix problem that serves as the starting point in our reductions. Finally we
conclude in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries and Main Results
Notation. We use R+ to denote the set of nonnegative real numbers andQ+ to denote the set of nonnegative
rational numbers. Given a positive integer n, we use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. Given two integers m
and n, where m ≤ n, we use [m : n] to denote the set {m,m+ 1, . . . , n}. Given a vector y ∈ Rm, we use
B(y, c) to denote the set of x with ‖x− y‖∞ ≤ c.
2.1 Arrow-Debreu Markets and Market Equilibria
An Arrow-Debreu exchange market M consists of a finite set of traders, denoted by {T1, . . . , Tn} for some
n ≥ 1, and a finite set of goods, denoted by {G1, . . . , Gm} for some m ≥ 1. Each trader Ti owns an initial
endowment wi ∈ Rm+ , where wi,j denotes the amount of goodGj she initially owns. Each trader Ti also has
a utility function ui : Rm+ → R+, where ui(xi,1, . . . , xi,m) represents the utility she derives if the amount of
Gj she obtains by the end is xi,j for each j ∈ [m]. In the rest of the paper, we will refer to an Arrow-Debreu
exchange market simply as a market for convenience.
Now let pi = (pi1, . . . , pim) 6= 0 denote a nonnegative price vector, with pij ≥ 0 being the price per unit
of Gj . Each trader Ti sells her initial endowment wi at prices pi and obtains a budget of
∑
j∈[m]wi,j · pij .
She then spends the budget to buy a bundle of goods xi ∈ Rm+ from the market to maximize her utility. We
say pi is a market equilibrium of M if we can assign each trader Ti an optimal bundle xi with respect to pi,
such that the total demand equals the total supply and the market clears. Formally, given pi we use opti(pi)
to denote the set of optimal bundles of Ti with respect to pi: x ∈ Rm+ is in opti(pi) if∑
j∈[m]
xj · pij ≤
∑
j∈[m]
wi,j · pij
and for any x′ ∈ Rm+ that satisfies the budget constraint above, we have ui(x) ≥ ui(x′).
Next we define the (aggregate) excess demand of a good with respect to a given price vector pi:
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Definition 1 (Excess Demand). Given pi, the excess demand Z(pi) consists of all vectors z of the form
z = x1 + · · ·+ xm − (w1 + · · ·+wm)
where xi is an optimal bundle in opti(pi) for each i ∈ [n]. For each good Gj we also use Zj(pi) to denote
the projection of Z(pi) on the jth coordinate.
In general, Z(pi) is a set and Z is a correspondence. We usually refer to a subset of traders in a market as
a submarket. Sometimes we are interested in the excess demand of a submarket, for which the sums of xi’s
and wi’s are only taken over traders in the subset. Finally we define market equilibria:
Definition 2 (Market Equilibria). We say pi is a market equilibrium of a market M if 0 ∈ Z(pi).
Notice that if zj > 0, then the traders request more than the total available amount of Gj and if zj ≤ 0
then they request at most as much amount of it as is available in the market. As opti(pi) is invariant under
scaling of pi (by a positive factor), it is easy to see that the set of market equilibria is closed under scaling.
We now define two versions of approximate market equilibria:
Definition 3 (-Approximate Market Equilibria). We call pi an -approximate market equilibrium of M for
some  > 0, if there exists a vector z ∈ Z(pi) such that zj ≤ 
∑
i∈[n]wi,j for all j ∈ [m].
Definition 4 (-Tight Approximate Market Equilibria). We callpi an -tight approximate market equilibrium
of M for some  > 0, if there exists a vector z ∈ Z(pi) such that |zj | ≤ 
∑
i∈[n]wi,j for all j ∈ [m].
Both notions of approximate equilibria have been used in the literature. Although the two-sided notion
of tight approximate equilibria is more commonly used, we present an unexpected CES market with ρ < 0
in Section 2.2, and prove that any (1/2)-tight approximate equilibrium pi must have one of the entries being
doubly exponentially small, when
∑
j pij = 1.
In general, a market equilibrium may not exist. The pioneering existence theorem of Arrow and Debreu
[AD54] states that if all the utility functions are quasi-concave, then under certain mild conditions a market
always has an equilibrium. In this paper, we use the weaker sufficient condition of Maxfield [Max97].
Definition 5 (Local Non-Satiation). We say u : Rm+ → R+ is locally non-satiated if for any vector x ∈ Rm+
and any  > 0, there exists a y ∈ B(x, ) such that u(y) > u(x). We say u is non-satiated with respect to
the kth good, if for any x ∈ Rm+ , there exists a y ∈ Rm+ such that u(y) > u(x) and yj = xj for all j 6= k.
If the utility of a trader is locally non-satiated, then her optimal bundle must exhaust her budget. There-
fore, if every trader in M has a non-satiated utility, then Walras’ law holds: z · pi = 0 for all z ∈ Z(pi).
Definition 6 (Economy Graphs). Given a market M , we define a directed graph as follows. Each vertex of
the graph corresponds to a good Gj in M . For two goods Gi and Gj in M , we add an edge from Gi to Gj ,
if there is a trader Tk such that wk,i > 0 and uk is non-satiated with respect to Gj , i.e., Tk owns a positive
amount of Gi and is interested in Gj . We call this graph the economy graph of M [Max97].2
We then call a market M strongly connected if its economy graph is strongly connected. Here is a simp-
lified version of the existence theorem from Maxfield [Max97]:
2 Maxfield defines this as a graph between the traders instead of the goods, but the sufficient condition of strong connectivity
is equivalent between the two versions, as long as each trader owns some good and is non-satiated with respect to some good, and
each good is owned by some trader and desired by some trader. Codenotti et al. [CMPV05] use in their analysis of CES markets
also the trader-based version which they decompose into strongly connected components (scc’s), but again it is not hard to show
that there is a correspondence between the nontrivial scc’s of the two graphs.
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Theorem 3 (Maxfield [Max97]). If the following two conditions hold, then M must have an equilibrium:
1). Every utility is continuous, quasi-concave and locally non-satiated; and 2). M is strongly connected.
2.2 CES Utility Functions
In this paper, we focus on the family of CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) utility functions:
Definition 7. We call u : Rm+ → R+ a CES function with parameter ρ < 1, ρ 6= 0, if it is of the form
u(x1, . . . , xm) =
∑
j∈[m]
αj · xρj
 1ρ
where the coefficients α1, . . . , αm ∈ R+.
Let T denote a trader with a CES utility function u in which αj > 0 if and only if j ∈ S ⊆ [m]. Let w
denote the initial endowment of T and let pi denote a price vector with pij > 0 for all j ∈ [m]. Then using
the KKT conditions, one can show that the unique optimal bundle of T consists of
xj =
(
αj
pij
)1/(1−ρ)
× w · pi∑
k∈S α
1/(1−ρ)
k · pi−ρ/(1−ρ)k
(1)
units of Gj , j ∈ S. It is also clear that if pij = 0 for some j ∈ S, then T would demand an infinite amount
of Gj . This implies that when a CES market is strongly connected, then pij must be positive for all j ∈ [m]
in any (exact or approximate) market equilibrium of M .
The problem of whether there exists an equilibrium in a CES market can be solved in polynomial time:
a simple necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium in a CES market was shown
in [CMPV05] based on the decomposition of the economy graph into strongly connected components. They
furthermore proved that the computation of an equilibrium for the whole market (if the condition is satisfied)
amounts to the computation of equilibria for the submarkets induced by the strongly connected components.
Thus, we will focus on markets with a strongly connected economy graph.
We are interested in the problem of computing an equilibrium in a market with CES utilities. As such a
market may not have a rational equilibrium in general, even when ρ and all the coefficients are rational, we
study the approximation of market equilibria. We define the following three problems:
1. CES: The input of the problem is a pair (k,M), where k is a positive integer encoded in unary (k
represents the desired number of bits of precision), and M is a strongly connected market in which
all utilities are CES, with the parameter ρi < 1 of each trader Ti being rational and given in unary
(because ρ appears in the exponent in the utility and demand functions). The parameters ρi’s for
different traders may be the same or different, and there may be a mixture of positive and negative
parameters. The endowments wi,j and coefficients αi,j are rational and encoded in binary. The goal
is to find a price vector pi that is within 1/2k of some equilibrium in every coordinate, i.e., such that
there exists an (exact) equilibrium pi∗ of M with
‖pi − pi∗‖∞ ≤ 1/2k
2. CES-APPROX: The input of the problem is the same as CES. The goal is to find an -approximate
market equilibrium of M , where  = 1/2k.
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3. For each (fixed) rational number ρ < −1, we also define the following problem ρ-CES-APPROX:
The input is the same as CES, except that the utilities of all the traders have the same fixed parameter
ρ, which is considered as a constant, not part of the input. The goal is to find an -approximate
market equilibrium of M , where  = 1/k.
The output of CES is usually referred to in the literature as a strongly approximate equilibrium. Besides, we
can also define CES under a model of real computation and ask for an exact equilibrium.
Finally we present the following example to justify the use of -approximate market equilibria, instead
of -tight approximate market equilibria, in both CES-APPROX and ρ-CES-APPROX.
Example 2.1. Fix a ρ < 0 and let r = |ρ| > 0. Let M denote the following CES market with parameter ρ.
Here M has n goods G1, . . . , Gn and n traders T1, . . . , Tn. Each Ti, i ∈ [n], has 2i(n+1) units of good Gi
at the beginning. Each Ti, i ∈ [n− 1], is equally interested in G1 and Gi+1 so in particular, T1 is interested
in only G1 and G2. Tn is only interested in G1. The economy graph of M is clearly strongly connected.
We prove the following lemma which implies that we need an exponential number of bits to represent
any (1/2)-tight approximate equilibrium of this market.
Lemma 1. If pi is a (1/2)-tight approximate market equilibrium of M , then we must have
maxj pij
minj pij
> 2n(1+r)
n−2
Proof. For each i ∈ [n− 1], since Ti is the only trader interested in Gi+1, we must have from (1)
the demand of Gi+1 from Ti =
2i(n+1) · pii
pi
1/(1+r)
i+1
(
pi
r/(1+r)
i+1 + pi
r/(1+r)
1
) ≥ 2(i+1)(n+1)−1
We denote (pii/pi1)1/(1+r) by ti for each i ∈ [n]. Using pii+1 > 0, we have
2n <
pii
pi
1/(1+r)
i+1 · pir/(1+r)1
=
(
pii
pii+1
)1/(1+r)( pii
pi1
)r/(1+r)
⇒ ti+1 < 2−n · (ti)1+r
From t1 = 1 and t2 < 2−n we can use induction to show that ti < 2−n(1+r)
i−2
for all i ∈ [2 : n].
We are now ready to state our main results for CES markets. First, in Section 5 and Section 6, we prove
the membership of CES in FIXP [EY10] and membership of CES-APPROX in PPAD [Pap94], respectively:
Theorem 4. CES is in FIXP.
Theorem 5. CES-APPROX is in PPAD.
We show in Section 4 that CES markets are PPAD-hard to solve when ρ < −1:
Theorem 6. For any rational number ρ < −1, the problem ρ-CES-APPROX is PPAD-hard.
Combining Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, we have
Corollary 1. For any rational number ρ < −1, the problem ρ-CES-APPROX is PPAD-complete.
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In the proof of Theorem 6 in Section 4, we present a polynomial-time reduction from a PPAD-hard pro-
blem (see Section 2.4) to ρ-CES-APPROX. The hard instances we construct are in fact very restricted in the
sense that each trader is interested in one or two goods and applies one of the following utility functions:
u(x) = x, u(x1, x2) = (x
ρ
1 + x
ρ
2)
1/ρ, or u(x1, x2) = (α · xρ1 + xρ2)1/ρ (2)
where α is a positive rational constant that depends on ρ only.
2.3 Non-Monotone Markets and Families of Utilities
We use U to denote a generic family of continuous, quasi-concave and locally non-satiated functions, e.g.,
linear functions, piecewise-linear functions (see Example 2.4), CES functions for a specific parameter of ρ
e.g. ρ = −3, or even the finite set of three functions given in (2). Ideas behind the proof of Theorem 6 allow
us to prove a PPAD-hardness result for the problem of computing an approximate equilibrium of a market
in which the utility function of each trader is either linear or from U , when the latter is “non-monotone” (to
be defined shortly). For this purpose, we formally set up the problem as follows.
First we assume that U is countable, and each function g ∈ U corresponds to a unique binary string so
that a trader can specify a function g ∈ U using a binary string. In a market with m goods, we say a trader
“applies” a function g ∈ U if her utility function u is of the form
u(x1, . . . , xm) = g
(
x`1
b1
, . . . ,
x`k
bk
)
,
where g ∈ U has k ≤ m variables; `1, . . . , `k ∈ [m] are distinct indices; and b1, . . . , bk are positive rational
numbers. In this way, each trader can be described by a finite binary string. We now useMU to denote the
set of all markets in which every trader has a rational initial endowment and applies a utility function from
U . We also useM∗U to denote the set of markets in which every trader has a rational initial endowment and
applies either a utility function from U or a linear utility with rational coefficients.
Second we assume that there exists a univariate function g∗ ∈ U that is strictly monotone.
Remark. We always make these two assumptions on a family of utilities U throughout this paper. Both of
them seem to be natural, and we only need them for technical reasons that will become clear later. When a
trader applies a function from U , she can always change units by scaling. The second assumption basically
allows us to add single-minded traders who spend all their budget on one specific good.
We next define non-monotone markets as well as non-monotone families of utilities:
Definition 8 (Non-monotone Markets and Families of Utilities). Let M be a market with k ≥ 2 goods. We
say M is non-monotone at a price vector pi if the following conditions hold: pij > 0 for all j ∈ [k] and
For some c > 0, the excess demand Z1(y1, . . . , yk) of G1 is a continuous function (instead of a
correspondence) over y ∈ B(pi, c), with Z1(pi) ≥ 0. The partial derivative of Z1 with respect
to y1 exists over B(pi, c), is continuous over B(pi, c), and is (strictly) positive at pi.
We call M a non-monotone market if there exists such a price vector pi. We call U a non-monotone family
of utilities if there exists a non-monotone market inMU .
Remark. By the definition, M being non-monotone at pi means that, raising the price of G1 while keeping
the prices of all other goods the same, would actually increase the total demand of G1. Also note that using
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Figure 1: The excess demand function Z1(x) of Example 2.2.
the continuity of Z1 as well as its partial derivative with respect to y1, we can indeed require, without loss of
generality, the price vector pi to be rational in Definition 8: if M is a non-monotone market at pi but pi is not
rational, then a rational vector pi∗ close enough to pi would have the same property. Therefore, whenever U
is non-monotone, there is a market M ∈ MU that is non-monotone at a rational price vector pi. We would
like to point out that M is not necessarily strongly connected. Also the excess demand Z1(pi) of G1 as well
as the partial derivative of Z1 with respect to y1 at pi do not have to be rational.
Now we state our PPAD-hardness result for a non-monotone family U of functions. We use U-MARKET
to denote the following problem: the input is a pair (k,M), where k is a positive integer in unary andM is a
strongly connected market fromM∗U encoded in binary. The goal is to output an -approximate equilibrium
of M with  = 1/k. While our hardness result essentially states that U-MARKET is PPAD-hard when U is
non-monotone, we need the following definition to make a formal statement:
Definition 9. We say a real number β is moderately computable if there is an algorithm that, given γ > 0,
outputs a γ-rational approximation β′ of β: |β′ − β | ≤ γ, in time polynomial in 1/γ.
Theorem 7. Let U denote a non-monotone family of utility functions. If there exists a market M ∈MU
such that M is non-monotone at a rational price vector pi such that the excess demand Z1(pi) of G1 at pi
is moderately computable, then the problem U-MARKET is PPAD-hard.
Remark. From the definition, U being non-monotone implies the existence of M and pi. The other assum-
ption made in Theorem 7 only requires that there exists one such pair (M,pi) for which Z1(pi) as a specific
positive number is moderately computable. We also point out that when the assumptions of Theorem 7 hold
such a pair M and pi is considered as a constant, which we later use in the proof of Theorem 7 as a gadget to
give a polynomial-time reduction from a PPAD-hard problem (see Section 2.4) to U-MARKET. As a result,
all components of M , including the number of goods and traders, the endowments of traders, binary strings
that specify their utility functions from U , are all considered as constants and encoded by binary strings of
constant length. This also includes the positive rational vector pi.
Now we present three examples of non-monotone markets, one with CES utilities of parameter ρ < −1,
one with Leontief utilities, and one with additively separable and piecewise-linear utilities:
Example 2.2 (A Non-Monotone Market with CES Utilities of ρ < −1). Consider the following market M
with two goods G1, G2 and two traders T1, T2. T1 has 1 unit of G1, T2 has 1 unit of G2 and the utilities are
u1(x1, x2) = (α · xρ1 + xρ2)1/ρ and u2(x1, x2) = (xρ1 + α · xρ2)1/ρ
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respectively. When ρ < −1 and α is large enough, [Gje96] proves that M has (1, 1) as an equilibrium and
is non-monotone at (1, 1). This implies that M has multiple isolated equilibria, and the set of equilibria of
a CES market with ρ < −1 is not convex (not even connected) in general. To see this, we let Z1(x) denote
the excess demand function of G1, when the price of G1 is 1 + x and the price of G2 is 1− x. We plot Z1 in
Figure 1. From the picture it is clear that the curve has three roots or equilibria. (When x goes to 1, Z1(x)
converges to 0 but is always negative.) We will formally prove properties of this curve later in Section 4.1
which play an important role in the proof of Theorem 6.
Example 2.3 (A Non-Monotone Market with Leontief Utilities). We say u is a Leontief utility function if
u(x1, . . . , xk) = min
j∈S
{
xj
aj
}
, where aj > 0 for all j ∈ S ⊆ [k].
Let M denote the Leontief market consisting of the following two traders T1 and T2. T1 has 1 unit of G1,
T2 has 1 unit of G2, and their utility functions are
u1(x1, x2) = min
{
x1/2, x2
}
and u2(x1, x2) = min
{
x1, x2/2
}
respectively. It is easy to show that M is non-monotone at (1, 1).
Example 2.4 (A Non-Monotone Market with Additively Separable and Piecewise-Linear Utilities). We
say a utility function is additively separable and piecewise-linear if it is of the form:
u(x1, . . . , xk) = f1(x1) + · · ·+ fk(xk) (3)
where f1, . . . , fk are all piecewise-linear functions. Consider the following market M with two goods
G1, G2 and two traders T1, T2. T1 has 1 unit of G1, and T2 has 1 unit of G2. Their utility functions are
u1(x1, x2) = x1 + f(x2) and u2(x1, x2) = f(x1) + x2 with f(x) =
{
2x if x ≤ 1/3
2/3 if x > 1/3
It can be shown that M has (1, 1) as an equilibrium and is non-monotone at (1, 1). Note that in general,
the excess demand of a market with such utilities is a correspondence instead of a map, and partial
derivatives may not always exist. But in the definition of non-monotone markets, we only need these
properties in a local neighborhood of pi, like (1, 1) here.
Since linear functions are special cases of additively separable and piecewise-linear functions, we get a
corollary from Theorem 7 and Example 2.4, that finding an approximate equilibrium in a market with addi-
tively separable and concave piecewise-linear utilities is PPAD-hard, shown earlier in [CDDT09]. Combin-
ing it with the membership of PPAD proved in [VY11], we have
Corollary 2.1. The problem of computing an approximate market equilibrium in a market with additively
separable and concave piecewise-linear utilities is PPAD-complete, even when each univariate function fj
in (3) is either linear or has the form of f in Example 2.4, i.e., linear function with a threshold.
2.4 Polymatrix Games and Nash Equilibria
To prove Theorem 6 and 7, we give a polynomial-time reduction from the problem of computing an approx-
imate Nash equilibrium in a polymatrix game [Jan68] with two pure strategies for each player. Such a game
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with n players can be described by a 2n× 2n rational matrix P, with all entries between 0 and 1.3
An -well-supported Nash equilibrium is a vector x ∈ R2n+ such that x2i−1 + x2i = 1 and
xT ·P2i−1 > xT ·P2i +  ⇒ x2i = 0
xT ·P2i > xT ·P2i−1 +  ⇒ x2i−1 = 0
for all i ∈ [n], where P2i−1 and P2i denote the (2i− 1)th and (2i)th column vectors of P, respectively.
Let POLYMATRIX denote the following problem:
Given a polymatrix game P, compute an -well-supported Nash equilibrium with  = 1/n.
It was shown in [DGP09] that finding an exact Nash equilibrium of a polymatrix game with two strate-
gies for each player is PPAD-hard (it is not stated explicitly there, but it follows from the proof of Lemma
6.3). We prove in Section 7 that POLYMATRIX is also PPAD-hard. The proof follows techniques developed
in previous work on Nash equilibria [DGP09, CDT09]. While its PPAD-hardness is used here as a bridge to
establish Theorem 6 and Theorem 7, we think the result on POLYMATRIX is interesting for its own right.
Theorem 8. POLYMATRIX is PPAD-complete.
2.5 Proof Sketch of the Hardness Reductions
We give a rough overview of the constructions for the main results.
For Theorem 7, given any 2n×2n polymatrix game P we construct a market MP in which the utility of
each trader is either linear or from U . We then show that given any -approximate equilibrium pi of MP for
some polynomially small , we can recover a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
A building block of our construction is the linear price-regulating markets [CDDT09, VY11]. We let τ
and α denote two positive parameters. Such a market consists of two traders T1, T2 and two goods G1, G2.
Ti owns τ units of Gi, i ∈ {1, 2}. The utility of T1 is (1 +α)x1 +x2 and the utility of T2 is x1 + (1 +α)x2.
Let pii denote the price of Gi, then we have the following useful property: Even if we add more traders to
the market, as long as their total endowment of G1 and G2 is negligible compared to that of T1 and T2, the
ratio of pi1 and pi2 must lie between (1− α)/(1 + α) and (1 + α)/(1− α) at an approximate equilibrium.
Our construction starts with the following blueprint of encoding a vector x of 2n variables and the 2n
linear forms xT · Pj , j ∈ [2n], in MP. Let G1, . . . , G2n and H1, . . . ,H2n denote 4n goods. Let τ denote
a large enough polynomial in n. Let α and β denote two polynomially small parameters with α  β. For
each i ∈ [n], we first create a price-regulating market over G2i−1 and G2i with parameters τ and α, and a
price-regulating market over H2i−1 and H2i with parameters τ and β. Then for each i ∈ [2n] and j ∈ [2n],
we add a trader, denoted by Ti,j , who owns Pi,j units of Hi and is only interested in Gj .
At this moment, the property of price-regulating markets mentioned above implies that at any approxi-
mate equilibrium pi, the ratio of pi(H2i−1) and pi(H2i) is between (1−β)/(1 +β) and (1 +β)/(1−β) and
the ratio of pi(G2i−1) and pi(G2i) is between (1− α)/(1 + α) and (1 + α)/(1− α), where we use pi(G) to
denote the price of a good G in pi. Here is some wishful thinking: If for every i ∈ [n],
pi(H2i−1) + pi(H2i) = pi(G2i−1) + pi(G2i) = 2
3Usually in a polymatrix game the 2× 2 block diagonal matrices are set to 0: P2i−1,2i−1 = P2i−1,2i = P2i,2i−1 = P2i,2i = 0
for all i ∈ [n]. We do not impose such a requirement to simplify the reduction from polymatrix games to markets later.
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then we can extract a vector x from pi as follows: For each i ∈ [2n], let
xi =
pi(Hi)− (1− β)
2β
It is clear that x is nonnegative; and x2i−1 + x2i = 1 for all i ∈ [n]. The linear forms x · Pj appear in the
market MP as follows: The total money that traders Ti,j , i ∈ [2n], spend on Gj is∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,j · pi(Hi) =
∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,j ·
(
2βxi + (1− β)
)
= 2β · xT ·Pj + (1− β)
∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,j
Again with some wishful thinking, we assume that the sums
∑
i∈[2n] Pi,j are the same for all j. As β  γ,
xT · P2j−1 > xT · P2j + 1/n would imply that the total demand for G2j−1 from traders Ti,2j−1, i ∈ [2n]
must be strictly larger than that of G2j from traders Ti,2j , i ∈ [2n]. To achieve an approximate equilibrium,
the price-regulating market over G2j−1 and G2j must demand strictly more G2j than G2j−1, to balance the
deficit. But this can only happen when pi(G2j−1) and pi(G2j) are 1 + α and 1− α, respectively.
However, what we really need to finish the construction is pi(H2j−1) = 1 + β and pi(H2j−1) = 1 − β,
so that x2j−1 = 1, x2j = 0 and the Nash constraint is met. The big missing piece of the puzzle is then how
to enforce at any approximate equilibrium the following ratio amplification:
pi(G2j−1)
pi(G2j)
=
1 + α
1− α ⇒
pi(H2j−1)
pi(H2j)
=
1 + β
1− β
It turns out that our goal can be achieved by adding carefully a long chain of copies of a non-monotone
market M as well as price-regulating markets and traders who transfer money between them (like the Ti,j’s
above). For each j ∈ [n] we add such a chain that starts from G2j−1, G2j and ends at H2j−1, H2j . The non
monotone markets together with price-regulating markets, can step-by-step amplify the ratio of two goods,
either from (1 + α)/(1− α) to (1 + β)/(1− β) or from (1− α)/(1 + α) to (1− β)/(1 + β).
The tricky part of the construction is that all the actions happen in the local neighborhood of M , where
the phenomenon of non-monotonicity appears. Once the chains are added to MP, we show that the wishful
thinking assumed earlier actually holds, approximately though, and we get a polynomial-time reduction.
For Theorem 6 the major challenge is that we can no longer use the linear price-regulating markets, but
only CES utilities with a fixed ρ < −1. Note that we used the following two properties of price-regulating
markets: The price ratio is bounded between (1−α)/(1+α) and (1+α)/(1−α); and must be equal to one
of them if the demand of G1 from the price-regulating market is different from that of G2. The continuous
nature of CES utilities however, makes it difficult, if not impossible, to construct a CES market that behaves
similarly.
Instead we use the simple two-good two-trader market M from [Gje96] which is itself a non-monotone
market with three isolated market equilibria. The high-level picture of the construction is similar to that of
Theorem 7, in which we add to MP a long chain of copies of the non-monotone market M for each j ∈ [n]
starting from G2j−1, G2j and ending at H2j−1, H2j . The proof of correctness, however, is more challenging
for which we need to first prove a few global properties of M . With these properties we show that whenever
the ratio of pi(G2j−1) and pi(G2j) deviates from 1 by a non-negligible amount, the chain would amplify the
ratio step by step. By the end of the chain at H2j−1 and H2j , the ratio converges to one of two constants that
correspond to the two nontrivial equilibria of M . Correctness of the reduction then follows.
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3 From Polymatrix to Markets with Non-Monotone and Linear Utilities
We prove Theorem 7 in this section. Let U denote a non-monotone family of utilities and M ∈MU denote
a market that is non-monotone at a rational price vector pi. We use k ≥ 2 to denote the number of goods in
M . We also assume that the excess demand Z1(pi) of G1 at pi is moderately computable.
3.1 Normalized Polymatrix Games
To prove Theorem 7, we give a polynomial-time reduction from POLYMATRIX to strongly connected mar-
kets inM∗U . Let P be a rational 2n× 2n matrix that has entries between 0 and 1.
We can normalize P to get a 2n× 2n matrix P′ as follows: For all i ∈ [2n] and j ∈ [n], set
P ′i,2j−1 = 1/2 + (Pi,2j−1 − Pi,2j)/2 and P ′i,2j = 1/2− (Pi,2j−1 − Pi,2j)/2
It is clear that P′ is also a rational matrix with entries between 0 and 1. In addition, P′ satisfies
P ′i,2j−1 + P
′
i,2j = 1, for all i ∈ [2n] and j ∈ [n]. (4)
From the definition of -well-supported Nash equilibria, it is easy to show that
Lemma 2. For any  ≥ 0, P and P′ have the same set of -well-supported Nash equilibria.
From now on we assume, without loss of generality, that P is normalized, meaning that P satisfies (4).
3.2 Normalized Non-Monotone Markets
Note that in Example 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, the market we construct not only is non-monotone at 1 = (1, 1) but
also has Z1(1) = 0. (Indeed 1 is an equilibrium in all three examples.) The lemma below shows that this is
not really a coincidence. Recall that M ∈MU is a market that is non-monotone at a rational vector pi, with
k ≥ 2 goods, such that Z1(pi) is moderately computable. We use M and pi to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1 (Normalized Non-Monotone Markets). There exist two (not necessarily rational) positive
constants c and d with the following property. Given any γ > 0, one can build a market Mγ ∈MU with
k ≥ 2 goods G1, . . . , Gk, in time polynomial in 1/γ, such that
Let fγ(x) denote the excess demand function of G1 when the price of G1 is 1 + x and the prices
of all other (k − 1) goods are 1− x. Then fγ is well defined over [−c, c] with |fγ(0)| ≤ γ and its
derivative f ′γ(0) = d > 0. For any x ∈ [−c, c], fγ(x) also satisfies∣∣fγ(x)− fγ(0)− dx∣∣ ≤ |x/D|, where D = max{20, 20/d}.
Proof. First, we construct M ′ from M by scaling: For each trader with utility function u and initial endow-
ment vector w ∈ Qk+, replace them by w′j = wj · pij for every j ∈ [k] and
u′(x1, . . . , xk) = u
(
x1
pi1
, . . . ,
xk
pik
)
Since pi is rational and positive, we have M ′ ∈ MU . It is also easy to verify that M ′ now is non-monotone
at 1. Let g(x) denote the excess demand function of G1 when the price of G1 is 1 + x and the prices of all
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other goods are 1− x, then by the definition of non-monotone markets, there exist two positive constants c
and d such that g is well defined over [−c, c], g(0) ≥ 0 and g′(0) = d > 0. The latter follows from the fact
that the excess demand at (1 + x, 1− x, . . . , 1− x) is the same as that at ((1 + x)/(1− x), 1, . . . , 1). As d
(and thus, D) is a constant, it follows from g′(0) = d that by setting c to be a small enough constant:∣∣g(x)− g(0)− dx∣∣ ≤ |x/D|, for all x ∈ [−c, c].
Next, let Z ′1 = g(0) denote the excess demand of G1 in M ′ at 1. Then Z ′1 = pi1 · Z1(pi) and thus, Z ′1 is
also moderately computable. Given any γ > 0, we compute a γ-rational approximation z of Z ′1. We assume
without loss of generality, that z is nonnegative; otherwise, simply set z = 0. Finally, we constructMγ from
M ′ by adding a trader with z units of G1 who is only interested in Gk.
Let fγ(x) denote the excess demand function of G1 in Mγ , when the price of G1 is 1 + x and all other
goods have price 1− x. The construction of Mγ then implies that fγ(x) = g(x)− z and thus, |fγ(0)| ≤ γ.
It follows that Mγ and fγ satisfy all the desired properties with respect to constants c and d above.
3.3 Our Construction
Given a normalized 2n× 2n polymatrix game P, we construct a market MP ∈M∗U in polynomial time (in
the input size of P) as follows. First of all, the two main building blocks of MP are
Normalized Non-Monotone Market: We use the following notation. Given two positive rational numbers
µ and γ, we use NM (µ, γ,G1, . . . , Gk) to denote the creation of the following set of traders in MP. First,
we make a new copy of Mγ in which the k goods that they are interested in are G1, . . . , Gk. Then for each
trader inMγ with utility function u(x1, . . . , xk) and endowmentw = (w1, . . . , wk), where we let xj denote
the amount of Gj she buys and let wj denote the amount of Gj she owns, replace w by µw and u by
u′(x1, . . . , xk) = u
(
x1
µ
, . . . ,
xk
µ
)
It is clear that when µ is polynomially bounded and γ is polynomially small in n, it takes time polynomial
in n to create these traders. Let fµ,γ(x) denote the excess demand of G1 when the price of G1 is 1 + x and
the prices of all other goods are 1 − x, then we have fµ,γ(x) = µ · fγ(x). From the properties of fγ stated
in Lemma 3.1, fµ,γ is well defined over [−c, c], satisfies |fµ,γ(0)| ≤ µγ, and∣∣fµ,γ(x)− fµ,γ(0)− µdx∣∣ ≤ |µx/D|, for all x ∈ [−c, c], with D = max{20, 20/d}. (5)
Recall here c and d are positive constants from Lemma 3.1, which do not depend on γ or µ.
Price-Regulating Market: Let G1, . . . , G` denote ` ≥ 2 goods in MP and let λ and α denote two positive
rational numbers, where α < 1. We use PR(λ, α,G1, . . . , G`) below to denote the creation of the following
two traders T1, T2, and refer to the submarket they form as a price-regulating market [CDDT09, VY11].
The endowment of T1 is (`− 1)λ units of G1, and the endowment of T2 is λ units of G2, . . . , G` each.
Let u1 and u2 denote their utility functions, then both are linear functions and we have
u1(x1, . . . , x`) = (1 + α)x1 +
∑
2≤j≤`
(1− α)xj and u2(x1, . . . , x`) = (1− α)x1 +
∑
2≤j≤`
(1 + α)xj
where in both u1 and u2 we used xj to denote the amount of Gj bought.
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We will see that, when λ is large enough and certain conditions are satisfied, a price-regulating market
basically requires the prices of G2, . . . , G` to be the same when ` > 2; and the ratio of prices of G1 and G2
to be between (1− α)/(1 + α) and (1 + α)/(1− α), in any approximate market equilibrium.
Other than these two building blocks, all other traders in MP are indeed single-minded: Each of them is
only interested in one specific good and spends all her budget on it. We use the following notation. First we
say a trader is a (τ,G1 : G2)-trader if her endowment consists of τ units of G1 and she is only interested in
G2. Second we say a trader is a (τ,G1, G2 : G3)-trader if her endowment consists of τ units of G1 and G2
each, and she is only interested in G3.
Now we describe the construction of MP. Without loss of generality, we always assume that n = 2t for
some integer t. Then the market MP consists of the following O(ntk) = O(n log n) goods:
AUXi, G2i−1,j , G2i,j , and Si,`,r, for i ∈ [n], j ∈ [0 : 4t], ` ∈ [4t] and r ∈ [3 : k].
Note that when k = 2, we do not have any of the goods Si,`,r in MP.
We also divide the goods, except the AUXi’s, into the following n(4t+ 1) groups {Ri,j}, where i ∈ [n]
and j ∈ [0 : 4t]. For each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t], we useRi,j to denote the following group of k goods:
Ri,j =
{
G2i−1,j , G2i,j , Si,j,3, . . . , Si,j,k
}
and for each i ∈ [n], we useRi,0 to denote the following group of two goodsRi,0 : {G2i−1,0, G2i,0}.
Next we list all the parameters used in the construction. We use αi to denote 2i/n5 for each i ∈ [0 : 4t]
so α0 = 1/n5 and α4t = 1/n. Recall the positive constant d from Lemma 3.1. We let d∗ denote a positive
rational number (a constant) that satisfies
1− 1/D ≤ d∗d ≤ 1, where D = max{20, 20/d}.
We list the parameters: β = 1/n, µ = d∗n, τ = n2, γ = 1/n6, ξ = nt, δ = t and  = 1/n8.
Construction of MP. First we use NM and PR to build a closed economy over each group Ri,j . Here by a
closed economy over a group of goods, we mean a set of traders whose endowments consist of goods from
this group only and they are interested in goods from this group only.
1. For each groupRi,j , where i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t], we add a price-regulating market
PR
(
τ, αj , G2i−1,j , G2i,j , Si,j,3, . . . , Si,j,k
)
We also add a non-monotone market
NM
(
µ, γ,G2i−1,j , G2i,j , Si,j,3, . . . , Si,j,k
)
We will refer to them simply as the PR market and the NM market overRi,j , respectively.
2. For each groupRi,0 of {G2i−1,0, G2i,0}, where i ∈ [n], we add a price-regulating market
PR
(
τ, α0, G2i−1,0, G2i,0
)
We will refer to it as the PR market overRi,0.
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Ri,0
G2i,0
G2i−1,0
Ri,1
G2i,1
G2i−1,1
Ri,4t−1
G2i,4t−1
G2i−1,4t−1
Ri,4t
G2i,4t
G2i−1,4t
Figure 2: A chain of markets over groupsRi,j of goods, where j ∈ [0 : 4t].
Next we add a number of single-minded traders who trade between different groups. The initial endow-
ment of each such trader consists of G2i−1,j and G2i,j of a groupRi,j (one of them or both) and she is only
interested in either G2i′−1,j′ or G2i′,j′ of another groupRi′.j′ , where (i, j) 6= (i′, j′). We will refer to her as
a trader who trades fromRi,j toRi′,j′ .
At the same time we construct a weighted directed graph G = (V,E) which will be used in the proof of
correctness only. Here each group of goodsRi,j corresponds to a vertex in the graph G so |V | = n(4t+ 1).
Now given two groups Ri,j and Ri′,j′ , we add an edge from Ri,j to Ri′,j′ in G whenever we create a set of
traders who trade from Ri,j to Ri′,j′ . Our construction below always makes sure that, whenever we create
a set of traders who trade fromRi,j toRi′,j′ , the total initial endowment of these traders must consist of the
same amount, say w > 0, of G2i−1,j and G2i,j . We then set w as the weight of this edge. We will prove, by
the end of the construction that G is a strongly connected graph and for each group Ri,j , its total in-weight
is the same as its total out-weight.
Here is the construction:
1. For each i ∈ [2n], we use Gi to denote Gi,0 and Hi to denote Gi,4t for convenience. For each pair
i, j ∈ [n], we add to MP the following four traders who trade from groupRi,4t to groupRj,0: one
(P2i−1,2j−1, H2i−1 : G2j−1)-trader, one (P2i−1,2j , H2i−1 : G2j)-trader, one (P2i,2j−1, H2i : G2j−1)
trader, and one (P2i,2j , H2i : G2j)-trader. Since P is normalized, we have
P2i−1,2j−1 + P2i−1,2j = P2i,2j−1 + P2i,2j = 1
Thus, the total endowment of these four traders consists of one unit of H2i−1 and H2i each, so we
add an edge in G fromRi,4t toRj,0 with weight 1. At this moment, the total out-weight of each
Ri,4t in G (a complete bipartite graph) is n, and the total in-weight of eachRi,0 in G is n.
2. For each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : 4t− 1], we add two traders who trade from groupRi,j toRi,j+1: one
(n,G2i−1,j : G2i−1,j+1)-trader and one (n,G2i,j : G2i,j+1)-trader. We also add an edge in graph G
fromRi,j toRi,j+1 with weight n.
This finishes the construction of G. It is also easy to verify that G is a strongly connected graph, and every
vertex (group) has both its total in-weight and out-weight equal to n.
Finally, we add traders between AUXj andRj,0 for each j ∈ [n]. Let r2j−1 and r2j denote
r2j−1 = 2n−
∑
i∈[2n] Pi,2j−1 > 0 and r2j = 2n−
∑
i∈[2n] Pi,2j > 0 (6)
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G1
G2
G2i−1
G2i
G2n−1
G2n
H1
H2
H2i−1
H2i
H2n−1
H2n
Figure 3: Market MP: Black arrows correspond to single minded-traders from Hi’s to Gj’s.
Dashed arrows correspond to the chains of markets overRi,j’s pictured in Figure 2.
Because the polymatrix game P is normalized, note that
r2j−1 + r2j = 2n, for any j ∈ [n].
Recall β = α4t = 1/n. We add toMP the following three traders: one ((1−β)r2j−1, AUXj : G2j−1)-trader,
one ((1− β)r2j , AUXj : G2j)-trader, and one ((1− β)n,G2j−1, G2j : AUXj)-trader.
This finishes the construction of MP. It follows immediately from the strong connectivity of G that the
economy graph of MP is strongly connected and thus, MP is a valid input of problem U-MARKET and can
be constructed from P in polynomial time. We also record the following properties of MP:
Lemma 3. For each i ∈ [n], the total supply of AUXi is 2(1− β)n;
For each i ∈ [2n], the total supply of Gi,0 is n2 +O(n);
For each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t], the total supply of G2i−1,j is (k − 1)n2 +O(n); and
For each i ∈ [n], j ∈ [4t] and ` ∈ [3 : k], the total supply of G2i,j and Si,j,` is n2 +O(n).
3.4 Proof of Correctness
First we introduce additively approximate market equilibria to simplify the presentation:
Definition 10. We say pi is an -additively approximate market equilibrium of a market M , for some  ≥ 0,
if there exists a vector z ∈ Z(pi) such that zj ≤  for all j.
Let pi denote a (1/(kn10))-approximate equilibrium ofMP, then by Lemma 3 it must be an -additively
approximate equilibrium of MP as well, where  = 1/n8. We prove in the rest of this section that given an
-additively approximate equilibrium pi of MP, we can compute a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium
of P in polynomial time. Theorem 7 then follows. In the proof below we use pi(G) to denote the price of a
good G in the price vector pi. We use a = b± c, where c > 0, to denote the inequality b− c ≤ a ≤ b+ c.
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First, from the PR markets in MP, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Let pi denote an -additively approximate equilibrium of MP with  = 1/n8, then we have
1− αj
1 + αj
≤ pi(G2i−1,j)
pi(G2i,j)
≤ 1 + αj
1− αj , for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : 4t].
Furthermore, we also have pi(G2i,j) = pi(Si,j,3) = · · · = pi(Si,j,k) for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t].
Proof. We consider the case when i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t] since the case of j = 0 is simpler.
Denote the two traders in the PR market overRi,j by T1 and T2. We let
pmin = min
{
pi(G2i,j), pi(Si,j,3), . . . , pi(Si,j,k)
}
and pmax = max
{
pi(G2i,j), pi(Si,j,3), . . . , pi(Si,j,k)
}
First, assume for contradiction that
1 + αj
pi(G2i−1,j)
<
1− αj
pmin
It follows that neither T1 nor T2 is interested in G2i−1,j and they only buy goods fromRi,j that are priced at
pmin. Let Fmin ⊂ Ri,j denote the set of such goods then we have G2i−1,j /∈ Fmin. On the other hand, by the
definition of pmin, the budget of both T1 and T2 is at least (k− 1)τ pmin. It follows that the total demand for
goods in Fmin is at least 2(k− 1)τ . However, the total supply of goods in Fmin is at most (k− 1)τ +O(n),
contradicting with the assumption that pi is an -additively approximate equilibrium.
Next, assume for contradiction that
1− αj
pi(G2i−1,j)
>
1 + αj
pmax
and we let Fmax ⊂ Ri,j denote the set of goods priced at pmax. Then neither T1 nor T2 is interested in goods
from Fmax and they only buy goods fromRi,j − Fmax. In particular, T2 spends the part of budget she earns
from selling Fmax on goods inRi,j − Fmax as well. As goods in Fmax are the most expensive amongRi,j ,
the demand for one of the goods inRi,j − Fmax must be larger than the supply by Ω(τ), contradicting with
the assumption that pi is an -additively approximate equilibrium.
Combining these two steps, we immediately get
1− αj
1 + αj
≤ pi(G2i−1,j)
pmax
≤ pi(G2i−1,j)
pi(G2i,j)
≤ pi(G2i−1,j)
pmin
≤ 1 + αj
1− αj (7)
In the rest of the proof, we show that pi(G2i,j) = pi(Si,j,3) = · · · = pi(Si,j,k).
Assume for contradiction that this is not the case. Then pmax > pmin which implies that neither T1 nor
T2 is interested in Fmax. This leads us to the same contradiction, following the argument of the second step.
The only difference is that pi(G2i−1,j) now might be larger than pmax but can be bounded using (7).
From now on, for each groupRi,j , i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : 4t], we let pii,j = pi(G2i−1,j) + pi(G2i,j).
Next note that only one trader is interested in AUXj and her budget is (1− β)npij,0. From this we have
Lemma 5. Let pi denote an -additively approximate market equilibrium of MP with  = 1/n8. If we scale
pi so that pij,0 = 2 for some j ∈ [n], then we have pi(AUXj) ≥ 1−O(/n)
Proof. As the total supply of AUXj is 2n(1− β), we have 2n(1− β) ≤ (2n(1− β) + )pi(AUXj).
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Now by using the strong connectivity of the graph G and the property that each vertex in G has the same
total in-weight and out-weight, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6. Let pi denote an -additively approximate equilibrium of MP. Let pimax and pimin denote
pimax = max
i,j
pii,j and pimin = min
i,j
pii,j
where the max and min are both taken over all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : 4t]. If we scale pi so that pimin = 2 then
we must have pimax = 2 +O(t).
Proof. For convenience, we use u, v to denote vertices (groups) in G. For each u in G, we use piu to denote
pii,j if u corresponds toRi,j . An edge from u to v of weight w means traders from u to v spend wpiu on v.
Now fix a vertex v and letR denote its corresponding group of goods. By Lemma 4 we know the prices
of all goods inR are close to each other. As pi is an -approximate equilibrium, we must have
total money spent on goods inR− total worth of goods inR ≤ O(kpiv) = O(piv) (8)
For those traders in the closed economy overR, by Walras’ law, the money they spend onR is equal to the
total worth of their initial endowments of R, so they cancel each other in (8). We next list all other traders
in MP who either own goods inR at the beginning or are interested in goods inR:
1. Let N−(v) denote the set of predecessors of v, then for each u ∈ N−(v), the amount of money
that traders from u to v spend onR is wu,v · piu, where wu,v denotes the weight of edge (u, v).
2. Let N+(v) denote the set of successors of v, then for each u ∈ N+(v), the total worth of goods
inR owned by traders from v to u at the beginning is wv,u · piv.
3. IfR = Rj,0 for some j ∈ [n], then there are three more traders: one ((1− β)r2j−1, AUXj : G2j−1)
trader, one ((1− β)r2j , AUXj : G2j)-trader, and one ((1− β)n,G2j−1, G2j : AUXj)-trader.
Since these are all the traders in MP relevant to goods inR, from Lemma 5 and (8), we have∑
u∈N−(v)
wu,v · piu −
∑
u∈N+(v)
wv,u · piv ≤ O(piv), for each v ∈ V . (9)
Now we use (9) to prove the lemma:
1. First of all, each groupRi,j , where i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t− 1], has exactly one predecessor
Ri,j−1 and one successorRi,j+1, both with weight n. From (9), we have
pii,j−1 − pii,j ≤ O(pii,j/n), for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t− 1]. (10)
2. Next, each groupRi,4t, where i ∈ [n], has only one predecessorRi,4t−1 with weight n,
and n successors each with weight 1. From (9), we have
pii,4t−1 − pii,4t ≤ O(pii,4t/n), for all i ∈ [n]. (11)
3. Finally, each groupRi,0, where i ∈ [n], has n predecessors {R`,4t}`∈[n], all of weight 1,
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and has one successorRi,1 with weight n. From (9), we have∑
`∈[n]
pi`,4t − npii,0 ≤ O(pii,0), for all i ∈ [n]. (12)
Let pii,j = pimin = 2 after scaling and pix,y = pimax. Using (10) and (11), we have
pii,0 ≤
(
1 +O(/n)
)4t · pii,j = 2(1 +O(t/n)) = 2 +O(t/n)
where we used the fact that t/n 1. Similarly, we also have
pix,4t ≥
(
1 +O(/n)
)−4t · pimax ≥ (1−O(t/n))pimax
Combining these two bounds with (12), we get
(n+O())(2 +O(t/n)) ≥ (n+O())pii,0 ≥
∑
`∈[n]
pi`,4t ≥ 2(n− 1) +
(
1−O(t/n))pimax
Solving it for pimax gives us pimax ≤ 2 +O(t), and the lemma is proven.
Using Lemma 6, we can also prove the following upper bound for pi(AUXj):
Lemma 7. Let pi denote an -additively approximate market equilibrium of MP with  = 1/n8. If we scale
pi so that pij,0 = 2 for some j ∈ [n], then we have pi(AUXj) ≤ 1 +O(t).
Proof. We revisit (8). Let v denote the vertex that corresponds toRj,0.
Plugging in (8) the list of traders enumerated in the proof of Lemma 6, we have∑
`∈[n]
pi`,4t + 2n(1− β) · pi(AUXj)− npij,0 − (1− β)npij,0 ≤ O(pij,0)
The lemma then follows directly from Lemma 6.
From now on, we use pi to denote the scaled price vector with pimin = 2. By Lemma 5, 6 and 7,
2 ≤ pii,j = pi(G2i−1,j) + pi(G2i,j) ≤ 2 +O(t) and pi(AUXi) = 1±O(t) (13)
for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : 4t]. For convenience, we let δ = t.
Recall that we use Hi to denote the good Gi,4t. For each i ∈ [n], we let
θi =
pi(H2i−1) + pi(H2i)
2
From (13) we get the following corollary:
Corollary 2. For every i ∈ [n], we have 1 ≤ θi ≤ 1 +O(δ).
Next we use Walras’ law to show that the excess demand of each good is close to 0 from both sides:
Lemma 8. If pi is an -additively approximate equilibrium of MP, then there exists a z ∈ Z(pi) such that
|z|∞ ≤ O(nt)
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Proof. Given a vector z ∈ Z(pi) and a good G in MP, we let z(G) denote the excess demand of G in z. By
definition, we know there exists a vector z ∈ Z(pi) such that z(G) ≤  for all G, thus |z(G)| ≤  for goods
G with positive excess demand. By Walras’ law, we also have z · pi = 0. By Lemma 4, 5, 6 and 7 we know
that all prices are close to each other. Since the total number of goods in MP is O(nt) and z(G) ≤  for all
G, it follows from Walras’ law that |z(G)| ≤ O(nt) for all G with negative excess demand.
From now on, we let ξ = nt = log n/n7.
Now we are ready to recover a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of the polymatrix game P from
the price vector pi. Set x to be the following 2n-dimensional nonnegative vector:
x2i−1 =
pi(H2i−1)− (1− β)θi
2βθi
and x2i =
pi(H2i)− (1− β)θi
2βθi
(14)
Recall that β = α4t = 1/n. It is easy to verify that x2i−1 + x2i = 1 for each i ∈ [n]. Here xi ≥ 0 follows
directly from Lemma 4. To finish the proof, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 9. When n is sufficiently large, x built above is a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of P.
To prove the main theorem, we need the following key lemma. Recall that Gi denotes the good Gi,0.
Lemma 9. For every i ∈ [2n], we have
1 + α0
pi(G2i−1)
=
1− α0
pi(G2i)
⇒ 1 + β
pi(H2i−1)
=
1− β
pi(H2i)
and
1− α0
pi(G2i−1)
=
1 + α0
pi(G2i)
⇒ 1− β
pi(H2i−1)
=
1 + β
pi(H2i)
Before proving Lemma 9, we use it to prove Theorem 9:
Proof of Theorem 9. Assume for contradiction that the vector x we construct from pi in (14) is not a (1/n)
well-supported Nash equilibrium of P. Without loss of generality, we assume that
xT ·P1 > xT ·P2 + 1/n (15)
where P1 and P2 denote the first and second columns of P, respectively, but x2 > 0. To reach a contradic-
tion, by Lemma 9, it suffices to show that (15) implies that
1 + α0
pi(G1)
=
1− α0
pi(G2)
(16)
because it then implies that (1 + β)/pi(H1) = (1− β)/pi(H2) and thus, x2 = 0 by (14).
To this end, we compare the total money spent by all traders in MP on G1 and G2 of groupR1,0, except
the two traders in the PR market overR1,0. Here is the list of such traders:
1. For each i ∈ [2n], there is a (Pi,1, Hi : G1)-trader. The total money these traders spend on G1 is∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,1 · pi(Hi) =
∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,1 · (1− β + 2β · xi) · θdi/2e
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2. For each i ∈ [2n], there is a (Pi,2, Hi : G2)-trader. The total money these traders spend on G2 is∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,2 · pi(Hi) =
∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,2 · (1− β + 2β · xi) · θdi/2e
3. Recall the definition of r2j−1 and r2j in (6).
There is one ((1− β)r1, AUX1 : G1)-trader, who spends her budget (1− β)r1 · pi(AUX1) on G1.
There is one ((1− β)r2, AUX1 : G2)-trader, who spends her budget (1− β)r2 · pi(AUX1) on G2.
We denote by M1 (or M2) the total money these traders spend on G1 (or G2, respectively). Then
M1 =
∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,1 · (1− β + 2β · xi) · θdi/2e + (1− β)r1 · pi(AUX1)
Plugging in θdi/2e ≥ 1, pi(AUX1) ≥ 1−O(δ) and the definition of r1, we get
M1 ≥ 2n(1− β) + 2β · xT ·P1 −O(nδ)
Similarly, we also have the total money spent on G2 is
M2 =
∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,2 · (1− β + 2β · xi) · θdi/2e + (1− β)r2 · pi(AUX1)
Plugging in θdi/2e ≤ 1 +O(δ), pi(AUX2) ≤ 1 +O(δ) and the definition of r2, we get
M2 ≤ 2n(1− β) + 2β · xT ·P2 +O(nδ)
Combining these two bounds with (15), we get
M1 ≥M2 + 2β · (1/n)−O(nδ) = M2 + Θ(β/n)
since β/n = 1/n2  nδ. So the difference between the demands for G1 and G2 from these traders is:
M1
pi(G1)
− M2
pi(G2)
≥ M2 + Θ(β/n)
pi(G1)
− M2(1 + α0)
pi(G1)(1− α0) =
Θ(β/n)
pi(G1)
− M2
pi(G1)
· 2α0
1− α0 = ω(ξ)
where the last inequality used the fact that M2 = O(n), α0 = 1/n5, β = 1/n, and ξ = log n/n7.
The only other traders interested in G1, G2 are the two traders in the price-regulating market over R1,0
denoted by T1 and T2. Also from the construction of MP, the total supply of G1 is exactly the same as that
of G2. By Lemma 8, we know that the total demand of G1 from T1 and T2 must be strictly smaller than the
total demand of G2 from them, which in turn implies that the total demand of G1 from T1 and T2 must be
strictly smaller than the total supply of G1 from T1 and T2 by Walras’ law.
Assume (16) does not hold, then by Lemma 4 we must have
1 + α0
pi(G1)
>
1− α0
pi(G2)
This implies that the (unique) optimal bundle of T1 is to buy back her initial endowment of G1 and thus, the
total demand of T1 and T2 for G1 is at least as much as the total supply of G1 from T1 and T2, contradicting
with Lemma 8. The theorem then follows.
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Finally, we prove Lemma 9. Using induction, it suffices to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 10. For every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t], we have
1 + αj−1
pi(G2i−1,j−1)
=
1− αj−1
pi(G2i,j−1)
⇒ 1 + αj
pi(G2i−1,j)
=
1− αj
pi(G2i,j)
and
1− αj−1
pi(G2i−1,j−1)
=
1 + αj−1
pi(G2i,j−1)
⇒ 1− αj
pi(G2i−1,j)
=
1 + αj
pi(G2i,j)
To this end, we examine a groupRi,j , i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [4t], more closely. For convenience, we scale the
price vector pi again so that pii,j = pi(G2i−1,j) + pi(G2i,j) = 2. Note that what we need to prove in Lemma
10 remains the same after scaling. We are interested in the total demand of G2i−1,j from all traders in MP
except those two traders in the price-regulating market PR overRi,j .
First of all, for the NM market over Ri,j , we let f(x) denote the excess demand (within the NM market
only) for G2i−1,j , when the price of G2i−1,j is 1 + x and the prices of G2i,j , Si,j,3, . . . , Si,j,k are 1− x. We
let µ = d∗n = O(n) and γ = 1/n6, then f is exactly fµ,γ in (5) and satisfies
|f(0)| = O(µγ) and ∣∣f(x)− f(0)− µdx∣∣ ≤ |µx/D|, for all x ∈ [−c, c] (17)
where D = max{20, 20/d} and c > 0 are both constants independent of n. So when n is sufficiently large,
we have β = α4t = 1/n c. Next we use h(x, y) to denote the following function:
h(x, y) = excess demand of G2i−1,j from all traders except those two in the PR overRi,j
when the price of G2i−1,j−1 is 1 + y, the price of G2i−1,j is 1 + x, and the prices of G2i,j , Si,j,3, . . . , Si,j,k
are 1− x. By Lemma 4 and 6, we are only interested in x, y satisfying |x| ≤ αj and |y| ≤ αj−1 +O(δ).
Using f , we obtain the following more explicit form of h since other than the NM and PR markets over
Ri,j , there are n units of G2i−1,j and only one (n,G2i−1,j−1 : G2i−1,j)-trader interested in G2i−1,j :
h(x, y) = f(x) +
n(1 + y)
1 + x
− n = f(x)− nx
1 + x
+
ny
1 + x
We now use (17) to prove the following useful lemma about h(x, y):
Lemma 11. For all x and y with |x| ≤ 3|y| and |y| = αj−1 ±O(δ), we have
h(x, y) > ny/2 if y > 0 and h(x, y) < ny/2 if y < 0
Proof. For x/(1 + x), we can approximate it by x when |x| is small:
|x/(1 + x)− x| = x2/(1 + x) ≤ 2x2
For f(x), by (17) we can approximate it by µdx:
|f(x)− µdx| ≤ |f(0)|+ |µx/D| = O(µγ) + |nx/20|
where we used D = max{20, 20/d} and the assumption that 1− 1/D ≤ d∗d ≤ 1.
As a result, we can approximate f(x)− nx/(1 + x) using (µd− n)x where the absolute value of error
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is bounded by 2nx2 +O(µγ) + |nx/20|. On the other hand, by the definition of d∗ we have
−nx/20 ≤ −nx/D ≤ (µd− n)x ≤ 0
Therefore, we can bound the absolute value |f(x)− nx/(1 + x)| by
2nx2 +O(µγ) + |nx/10|
From µ = O(n), γ = 1/n6, |x| ≤ 3|y| and |y| = αj−1 ±O(δ), this can be trivially bounded from above by
|ny/3|. The lemma then follows since |ny/(1 + x)| > |5ny/6|.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 10:
Proof of Lemma 10. We start by scaling pi so that pi(G2i−1,j) + pi(G2i,j) = 2. Depending on whether
1 + αj−1
pi(G2i−1,j−1)
=
1− αj−1
pi(G2i,j−1)
or
1− αj−1
pi(G2i−1,j−1)
=
1 + αj−1
pi(G2i,j−1)
we have either y = αj−1 ± O(δ) or −αj−1 ± O(δ) by Lemma 4 and Lemma 6. Moreover, from Lemma 4
we have |x| ≤ αj and thus, it always holds that |x| ≤ 3|y| since αj = 2αj−1 = ω(δ).
Therefore we can conclude from Lemma 11 that either
h(x, y) > ny/2 or h(x, y) < ny/2
respectively. Because nαj−1 ≥ nα4t  ξ, Lemma 8 implies that the excess demand of G2i−1,j , within the
price-regulating market PR overRi,j , must be either strictly negative or strictly positive, respectively.
When it is strictly negative, we know that the first trader T1 of the price-regulating market do not spend
all her budget on G2i−1,j . This combined with Lemma 4 implies that
1 + αj
pi(G2i−1,j)
=
1− αj
pi(G2i,j)
Similarly when it is strictly positive, we know that the second trader T2 must be interested in G2i−1,j as
well. This combined with Lemma 4 implies that
1− αj
pi(G2i−1,j)
=
1 + αj
pi(G2i,j)
The lemma then follows.
4 From Polymatrix to Markets with CES Utilities
We prove Theorem 6 in this section. Let ρ < −1 denote a fixed rational number. Let P denote a normalized
2n× 2n polymatrix game. First, we examine more closely the non-monotone market described in Example
2.2 with two goods and two traders. We then describe the construction of a strongly connected marketMP in
which every trader uses a CES utility function of parameter ρ. Finally, we show that given any approximate
equilibrium pi of MP, one can recover a well-supported Nash equilibrium of P efficiently. As we will see,
the construction of MP is similar to that of Section 3, but the proof of correctness is more involved.
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4.1 Properties of the Excess Spending Function of Example 2.2
We need the following notion of excess spending. Let S denote a subset of traders. Given pi and a good G,
the excess spending on G from traders in S is the product of pi(G) and the excess demand of G from S:(
total demand of G from S − total supply of G from S )× pi(G)
For convenience we always use r > 1 to denote −ρ.
We use M to denote the following market described earlier in Example 2.2 with two goods G1, G2 and
two traders T1, T2. Here T1 has 1 unit of G1, T2 has 1 unit of G2, and their utility functions are
u1(x1, x2) =
(
α · xρ1 + xρ2
)1/ρ and u2(x1, x2) = (xρ1 + α · xρ2 )1/ρ
for some rational number α > 0. By using the KKT conditions, one can prove that, give any positive prices
pi1 and pi2, the optimal bundles (x1,1, x1,2) and (x2,1, x2,2) are unique and must satisfy
x1,1
x1,2
=
(
α · pi2
pi1
)1/(1+r)
and
x2,1
x2,2
=
(
1
α
· pi2
pi1
)1/(1+r)
(18)
It is clear that (1, 1) is a market equilibrium of M .
From now on, we always assume that α is a positive rational number such that a = α1/(r+1) is rational
as well. We are interested in the excess spending f(x) on G1 from T1 and T2, when the prices pi1 = 1 + x
and pi2 = 1− x with x ∈ (−1, 1). Let mi,j denote the amount of money Ti spends on Gj , then
m1,1
m1,2
= a
(
pi1
pi2
)r/(1+r)
and
m2,1
m2,2
=
1
a
(
pi1
pi2
)r/(1+r)
We also have m1,1 +m1,2 = pi1. This gives us the following explicit form of m1,1, as a function of x:
m1,1(x) =
pi1
1 + 1a
(
pi2
pi1
) r
1+r
=
1 + x
1 + 1a
(
1−x
1+x
) r
1+r
Similarly, we have the following explicit form of m2,1, as a function of x:
m2,1(x) =
pi2
1 + a
(
pi2
pi1
) r
1+r
=
1− x
1 + a
(
1−x
1+x
) r
1+r
The excess spending function f(x) on G1 from T1 and T2 is then
f(x) = m1,1(x) +m2,1(x)− (1 + x), for x ∈ (−1, 1).
It is easy to show that f(0) = 0 and f(x) = −f(−x) for any x ∈ (−1, 1). From its symmetry, we have
f(x) = −f(−x) ⇒ f ′(x) = f ′(−x) ⇒ f ′′(x) = −f ′′(−x) ⇒ f ′′(0) = 0
Our first goal is to prove the following properties about the excess spending function f :
Lemma 12. When a > (r + 1)/(r − 1) is rational, f ′(0) > 0 is rational and f has three roots in (−1, 1).
Let {−θ, 0, θ} denote the three roots of f with θ > 0, then we have f ′(θ) < 0.
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Figure 4: The excess spending function f
Proof. First we replace x by the following variable y. Let
y1+r =
1− x
1 + x
and x =
1− y1+r
1 + y1+r
(19)
It suffices to show when a > (r + 1)/(r − 1), the following function p has three roots over (0,+∞):
p(y) =
2
(1 + y1+r)(1 + yr/a)
+
2y1+r
(1 + y1+r)(1 + ayr)
− 2
1 + y1+r
Let q(y) = (1 + y1+r)(1 + yr/a)(1 + ayr) · p(y). Then it suffices to show that q(y) has three roots:
q(y) = 2(1 + ayr) + 2y1+r(1 + yr/a)− 2(1 + yr/a)(1 + ayr) = 2
a
yr · (y1+r − ayr + ay − 1)
Taking the derivative of h(y) = y1+r − ayr + ay − 1, we get
h′(y) = (r + 1)yr − aryr−1 + a
It is easy to see that h(0) = −1 < 0, h(1) = 0, and h(y)→ +∞ when y → +∞. Moreover, we have
h′(1) = (r + 1)− ar + a = (r + 1)− a(r − 1) < 0
when a > (r + 1)/(r − 1). This immediately implies that h has at least three roots in (0,+∞) and thus, f
has at least three roots in (−1, 1). Next we show that h has at most three roots. To see this, we have
h′′(y) = r(r + 1)yr−1 − ar(r − 1)yr−2 = ryr−2((r + 1)y − a(r − 1))
Therefore, there is a threshold b = a(r − 1)/(r + 1) > 0 such that h′′(y) > 0 when y > b; and h′′(y) < 0
when y < b. This implies that h′(b) is the minimum of h′ over [0,+∞). It follows from h′(b) ≤ h′(1) < 0
that h′ has exactly one root in (0, b) and exactly one root in (b,+∞). This implies that h has at most three
roots in (0,+∞) and thus, f has at most three roots in (−1, 1). As a result, f has exactly three roots.
Let {−θ, 0, θ} denote the three roots of f with θ > 0, then {y(−θ), 1, y(θ)} are exactly the three roots
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Figure 5: The function g and the line −λx
of h. From the proof above we also have f ′(0) > 0 and f ′(θ) < 0. To see this, we have
f(x) = p
(
y(x)
) ⇒ f ′(x) = p′(y) · ( 1
1 + r
)
·
(
1− x
1 + x
) −r
1+r
· −2
(1 + x)2
This implies that f ′(0) = −2p′(1)/(1 + r). Taking the derivative of
(1 + y1+r)(1 + yr/a)(1 + ayr) · p(y) = 2yrh(y)/a
and plugging in h(1) = p(1) = 0 we get p′(1) = h′(1)/(1 + a)2 < 0 and thus, f ′(0) > 0 is rational. Next
by using h(y(θ)) = 0 and h′(y(θ)) > 0, we can similarly show that f ′(θ) < 0. The lemma follows.
From now on, we always assume that a > (r + 1)/(r − 1) and use {−θ, 0, θ} to denote the three roots
of f over (−1, 1) with θ > 0. Let λ = f ′(0), then we know that λ is rational and positive. Let
g(x) = f(x)− λx, for x ∈ (−1, 1).
From the definition of g(x), we have g(0) = 0, g′(0) = 0, and g′′(0) = 0.
Next we show that when a is chosen carefully, g satisfies the following property:
Lemma 13. Given any rational number r > 1, there is a rational number a such that a > (r + 1)/(r − 1)
α = a1+r is rational, and g(x) < 0 for all x ∈ (0, 1). By the symmetry of g, g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (−1, 0).
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there is an x∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that g(x∗) ≥ 0, and g(−x∗) ≤ 0. Similar
to the proof of Lemma 12, we use y in (19) to replace x. We are interested in p(y) over y ∈ (0,+∞):
p(y) =
2
(1 + y1+r)(1 + yr/a)
+
2y1+r
(1 + y1+r)(1 + ayr)
− 2
1 + y1+r
− λ · 1− y
1+r
1 + y1+r
By the definition of p(y), we have
g(x) = p
(
y(x)
) ⇒ p(1) = 0, p′(1) = 0 and p′′(1) = 0 (20)
using the chain rule and the fact that y′(x) is nonzero at x = 0. Let y1 = y(x∗) and y2 = y(−x∗), then we
have 0 < y1 < 1 < y2, p(y1) ≥ 0, and p(y2) ≤ 0. Next we use q(y) to denote the following function:
q(y) = (1 + y1+r)(1 + yr/a)(1 + ayr) · p(y)/2
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then we have
q(y) = (1 + ayr) + y1+r(1 + yr/a)− (1 + yr/a)(1 + ayr)− (λ/2)(1− y1+r)(1 + yr/a)(1 + ayr)
By the definition of q(y), we have q(y1) ≥ 0 and q(y2) ≤ 0. We use u, v, w > 0 to denote
u =
λ
2
, v =
aλ
2
+
λ
2a
+
1
a
and w = 1 +
λ
2
then we can rewrite q(y) as follows:
q(y) = u · y1+3r + v · y1+2r − w · y2r + w · y1+r − v · yr − u
Taking its derivative, we get
q′(y) = u(1 + 3r) · y3r + v(1 + 2r) · y2r − 2wr · y2r−1 + w(1 + r) · yr − vr · yr−1
Let q′(y) = yr−1 · s(y), then we have
s(y) = u(1 + 3r) · y1+2r + v(1 + 2r) · y1+r − 2wr · yr + w(1 + r) · y − vr
Taking its derivative, we get
s′(y) = u(1 + 3r)(1 + 2r) · y2r + v(1 + 2r)(1 + r) · yr − 2wr2 · yr−1 + w(1 + r) (21)
and its second-order derivative
s′′(y) = 2ur(1 + 3r)(1 + 2r) · y2r−1 + vr(1 + 2r)(1 + r) · yr−1 − 2wr2(r − 1) · yr−2
Let s′′(y) = yr−2 · t(y), then we have
t(y) = 2ur(1 + 3r)(1 + 2r) · yr+1 + vr(1 + 2r)(1 + r) · y − 2wr2(r − 1) (22)
We prove properties about these functions. First we show that s′′(1) is indeed positive when a is close
enough to (r + 1)/(r − 1). By (21), we have
s′′(1) = 2ur(1 + 3r)(1 + 2r) + vr(1 + 2r)(1 + r)− 2wr2(r − 1)
Let c = a+ 1/a. Plugging in v = cu+ 1/a and w = 1 + u, we have
s′′(1) = 2ur(1 + 3r)(1 + 2r) + (cu+ 1/a)(1 + 2r)(1 + r)r − 2(1 + u)r2(r − 1)
The trouble here is that λ (and u) depends on the choice of a. But note that the coefficient of u in s′′(1) is
2r(1 + 3r)(1 + 2r) + cr(1 + 2r)(1 + r)− 2r2(r − 1) > 0
and u is positive when a > (r + 1)/(r − 1). The rest of s′′(1) is the following:
(1/a)(1 + 2r)(1 + r)r − 2r2(r − 1)
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Let a = (1 + )(r + 1)/(r − 1). When  goes to 0, the expression above converges to
r(r − 1)(1 + 2r)− 2r2(r − 1) = r(r − 1)(1 + 2r − 2r) = r(r − 1) > 0
Therefore there exists a positive rational number a > (r + 1)/(r − 1) such that s′′(1) > 0 and α = a1+r is
rational (note we do not care about the number of bits needed to encode it). We use such an a from now on.
From the definition of q and s from p as well as the chain rule, one can show that p(1) = p′(1) = p′′(1) = 0
(equation 20) implies that q(1) = q′(1) = q′′(1) = 0 and s(1) = s′(1) = 0; Furthermore, since s′′(1) > 0
we have p′′′(1) > 0. Together with (20), we know there is a small enough  > 0 that satisfies:
p(1 + ) > 0, p(1− ) < 0 and y1 < 1−  < 1 +  < y2
Recall that p(y1) ≥ 0 and p(y2) ≤ 0. By the definition of q(y) from p(y), we have
q(y1) ≥ 0, q(1− ) < 0, q(1 + ) > 0 and q(y2) ≤ 0 (23)
In the rest of the proof we show that this cannot happen.
First it is easy to see that t(0) < 0; t(y) > 0 when y → +∞; and t′(y) > 0 for any y > 0. This shows
that there is a unique b ∈ (0,∞) such that t(y) < 0 for any y < b, t(b) = 0, and t(y) > 0 for any y > b.
Next using s′′(y) = yr−2 · t(y), the same statement above also holds for s′′(y).
Now we examine s′(y). Notice that s′(0) > 0 and s′(y) > 0 when y →∞. It follows from the property
of s′′(y) that going from y = 0 to +∞, the sign of s′(y) can change at most twice from positive to negative
and then back to positive.
Finally, regarding s(y), we have s(0) < 0; and s(y) > 0 when y → +∞. From the property of s′(y) we
know s(y) can have at most three roots in (0,+∞). From q′(y) = yr−1 · s(y), the same statement holds for
q′(y) as well. However, this contradicts with (23) because:
1. From q(0) < 0 and q(y1) ≥ 0, there exists a y ∈ (0, y1) such that q′(y) > 0;
2. From q(y1) ≥ 0 and q(1− ) < 0, there exists a y ∈ (y1, 1− ) such that q′(y) < 0;
3. From q(1− ) < 0 and q(1 + ) > 0, there exists a y ∈ (1− , 1 + ) such that q′(y) > 0;
4. From q(1 + ) > 0 and q(y2) ≤ 0, there exists a y ∈ (1 + , y2) such that q′(y) < 0;
5. From q(y2) ≤ 0 and q(y) > 0 when y → +∞, there exists a y ∈ (y2,+∞) such that q′(y) > 0.
It follows that q′(y) has at least four roots in (0,+∞) and we get a contradiction. The lemma follows.
From now on we always assume that a is positive and rational such that α = a1+r is rational, f satisfies
conditions of Lemma 12 and g satisfies conditions of Lemma 13. We also use λ to denote f ′(0), a positive
rational number, and use θ to denote the positive root of f . While θ is not rational in general, we can use f
(and h in the proof of Lemma 12) to compute a γ-rational approximation θ∗ of θ, i.e. |θ∗ − θ| ≤ γ, in time
polynomial in 1/γ. We let σ denote f ′(θ) < 0. The following corollaries follow from Lemma 12 and 13.
Corollary 3. We have g(x) < −λx < −λθ for any x ∈ (θ, 1); g(x) > −λx > −λθ for any x ∈ (0, θ).
Proof. By Lemma 12 we have f(x) < 0 for any x ∈ (θ, 1) and thus, g(x) = f(x)− λx < −λx.
By Lemma 12 we have f(x) > 0 for any x ∈ (0, θ) and thus, g(x) = f(x)− λx > −λx.
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Corollary 4. g(θ) = −λθ and g′(θ) = σ − λ < −λ.
Corollary 5. There exists a positive constant c such that for any x ∈ [−c, c], we have∣∣f(x)− λx∣∣ ≤ |λx/2| and ∣∣f(θ + x)− σx∣∣ ≤ |σx/2|
Given a sufficiently large positive integer N , we will be interested in the behavior of f and g over:
AN = [−δ, δ], BN = [δ, θ − δ], CN = [θ − δ, θ + δ] (24)
B′N = [−θ + δ,−δ], C ′N = [−θ − δ,−θ + δ] and SN = [−θ − δ, θ + δ]
where δ = 1/N . We use Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 to prove the following lemmas that will be useful later.
Lemma 14. When N is sufficiently large, we have |g(x)| ≤ |λx/2| for any x ∈ AN .
Proof. The lemma follows directly from the first part of Corollary 5.
Lemma 15. When N is sufficiently large, we have f(x) ≥ min(λ, |σ|)δ/2 for all x ∈ BN .
Proof. Assume for contradiction this is not the case, meaning that there is an infinite sequence of N and xN
such that xN ∈ BN but f(xN ) < min(λ, |σ|)δ/2. As xN ∈ [0, θ] is compact, there is a subsequence of xN
that converges to a root x∗ of f in [0, θ]. As 0 and θ are the only nonnegative roots of f , x∗ = 0 or θ. But no
matter which case it is, the derivative of f at x∗ is smaller than we expect and we get a contradiction.
Using Lemma 15, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 16. Assume that N is sufficiently large. If
g(x) = −λθ ±∆
where ∆ = δ(λ− σ/2), then we must have that x ∈ CN .
Proof. First, g(x) < 0 when N is sufficiently large. By Lemma 13 we have x > 0. Replacing x by θ + y:
f(θ + y)− λ(θ + y) = −λθ ±∆ ⇒ f(θ + y) = λy ±∆
As f(θ+ y) < 0 when y > 0, and f(θ+ y) > 0 when y < 0 (and x = θ+ y > 0), we have |y| < ∆/λ and
thus, Corollary 5 applies when N is sufficiently large: If y > 0, we have
3σy/2 ≤ λy ±∆ = f(θ + y) ≤ σy/2
which implies that 0 < y ≤ ∆/(λ− σ/2) = δ. The case when y < 0 can be proved similarly.
We also note that by the symmetry of f and g, similar lemmas can be proved for B′N and C
′
N .
4.2 Our Construction
Let ρ < −1 be a fixed rational number, with r = |ρ|. Given a normalized 2n× 2n polymatrix game P, we
construct a market MP in which every trader uses a CES utility function of parameter ρ. The main building
block in the construction of MP is the following:
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Non-Monotone CES Markets: We use M to denote the non-monotone CES market discussed in Example
2.2 and Section 4.1, with rational constants α and a satisfying all conditions of Lemma 12 and Lemma 13.
We use the following notation. Given a positive rational number µ, we use CES(µ,G1, G2) to denote the
creation of the following two traders T1 and T2 in MP. T1 and T2 are only interested in G1 and G2 and
have the same utility functions as those of the two traders in M . T1 has µ units of G1 and T2 has µ units of
G2. We use fµ(x) to denote the excess spending function on G1 from these two traders when the price of
G1 is 1 + x and the price of G2 is 1− x; then we have fµ(x) = µ · f(x).
Recall λ = f ′(0) is positive and rational, θ is the positive root of f , and σ = f ′(θ) < 0. Let m = n7.
Construction of MP. The market MP consists of the following O(nm) = O(n8) goods:
AUXi, G2i−1,j and G2i,j , for i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : m].
We also divide the goods into n(m+ 1) groups: Ri,j = {G2i−1,j , G2i,j}, for each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : m].
First for each i ∈ [n], we add a trader with τ = n4 units of G2i−1,0 and G2i,0 each, and set her utility
u(x1, x2) = (x
ρ
1 + x
ρ
2 )
1/ρ
where x1 (or x2) denotes the amount of G2i−1,0 (or G2i,0, respectively) she obtains.
Next for eachRi,j , i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], we create a market CES(µ,G2i−1,j , G2i,j) with µ = n/λ.
Now we add a number of single-minded traders who trade between different groups. Recall that we say
a trader is a (r,G1 : G2)-trader, if her endowment consists of r units of G1 and she is only interested in G2;
We say a trader is a (r,G1, G2 : G3)-trader, if her endowment consists of r units of G1 and G2 each, and is
only interested inG3. At the same time, we define a weighted directed graph G = (V,E) which will be used
in the proof of correctness later. The vertices of G correspond to the n(m+ 1) groupsRi,j . The meaning of
an edge and its weight in G is the same as the graph G defined in Section 3. Here is the construction:
1. For each i ∈ [2n], we use Gi to denote Gi,0 and Hi to denote Gi,m for convenience. For each pair
i, j ∈ [n], we add to MP the following four traders who trade from groupRi,m to groupRj,0: one
(P2i−1,2j−1, H2i−1 : G2j−1)-trader, one (P2i−1,2j , H2i−1 : G2j)-trader, one (P2i,2j−1, H2i : G2j−1)
trader, and one (P2i,2j , H2i : G2j)-trader. Since P is normalized, we have
P2i−1,2j−1 + P2i−1,2j = P2i,2j−1 + P2i,2j = 1
Thus, the total endowment of these four traders consists of one unit of H2i−1 and H2i each, so we
add an edge in G fromRi,m toRj,0 with weight 1. At this moment, the total out-weight of each
Ri,m in G (a complete bipartite graph) is n, and the total in-weight of eachRj,0 in G is n.
2. Next for each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], we add two traders who trade from groupRi,j−1 to groupRi,j :
one (n,G2i−1,j−1 : G2i−1,j)-trader and one (n,G2i,j−1 : G2i,j)-trader. As their total endowment
consists of n units of G2i−1,j−1 and G2i,j−1 each, we add an edge fromRi,j−1 toRi,j of weight n.
This finishes the construction of G. It is also easy to verify that G is strongly connected and each vertex has
both its total in-weight and out-weight equal to n.
Finally, for each j ∈ [n] we add traders between AUXj and Rj,0. Let r2j−1 and r2j be the two numbers
defined in (6). Let θ∗ denote a γ-rational approximation of θ, the positive root of f , where γ = 1/n7. Then
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we add the following three traders: one ((1−θ∗)r2j−1, AUXj : G2j−1)-trader, one ((1−θ∗)r2j , AUXj : G2j)
trader, and one ((1− θ∗)n,G2j−1, G2j : AUXj)-trader. Note that r2j−1 + r2j = 2n as P is normalized.
This finishes the construction of MP. It follows immediately from the strong connectivity of G that the
economy graph of MP is strongly connected as well. Thus, MP is a valid input of problem ρ-CES-APPROX
and can be constructed from P in polynomial time. We also record the following properties of MP:
Lemma 17. For each i ∈ [n], the total supply of good AUXi is 2n(1− θ∗);
For each i ∈ [2n], the total supply of good Gi,0 is τ + (2− θ∗)n; and
For each i ∈ [2n] and j ∈ [m], the total supply of good Gi,j is µ+ n = Θ(n).
4.3 Proof of Correctness
Now let pi denote an -additively approximate market equilibrium of MP where  = 1/n14. We show in the
rest of this section that given pi, one can compute a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of P efficiently
in polynomial time. Theorem 6 then follows. Below for eachRi,j , we let pii,j = pi(G2i−1,j) + pi(G2i,j).
First note that only one trader is interested in AUXj and thus,
Lemma 18. Let pi denote an -additively approximate equilibrium of MP, where  = 1/n14. If we scale pi
so that pij,0 = pi(G2j−1) + pi(G2j) = 2 for some j ∈ [n], then we have pi(AUXj) ≥ 1−O(/n).
Second, by using the strong connectivity of G and the property that every vertex in G has the same total
in-weight and out-weight, we can follow the proof of Lemma 6 (replacing 4t with m) to prove
Lemma 19. Let pi denote an -additively approximate equilibrium of MP. Let pimax and pimin denote
pimax = max
i,j
pii,j and pimin = min
i,j
pii,j
both taken over i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : m]. If we scale pi so that pimin = 2, then pimax = 2 +O(m).
Then we can follow the proof of Lemma 7 to prove the following upper bound on pi(AUXj):
Lemma 20. Let pi denote an -additively approximate equilibrium of MP with  = 1/n14. If we scale pi so
that pij,0 = 2 for some j ∈ [n], then we have pi(AUXj) ≤ 1 +O(m).
From now on, for each i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [0 : m] we use xi,j to denote the unique number that satisfies
1 + xi,j
1− xi,j =
pi(G2i−1,j)
pi(G2i,j)
Note that the xi,j’s are invariant under scaling of pi. If we scale pi so that pii,j = 2 for some i and j, then we
must have pi(G2i−1,j) = 1 + xi,j and pi(G2i,j) = 1− xi,j . Moreover, even if we scale pi so that the sum of
prices of another group becomes 2, we still have the following estimations by Lemma 18, 19 and 20:
pi(G2i−1,j) = 1 + xi,j ±O(m), pi(G2i,j) = 1− xi,j ±O(m) and pi(AUXj) = 1±O(m) (25)
It would be great if we can prove a lemma similar to Lemma 8. However, right now we have no bound
on the ratio of pi(G2i−1,j) and pi(G2i,j). Next we show that xi,0 must be very close to 0 for all i ∈ [n].
Lemma 21. If pi is an -additively approximate equilibrium, then |xi,0 | = O(1/n3) for all i ∈ [n].
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Proof. Fix an i ∈ [n]. We first scale pi so that pii,0 = 2, and use x to denote xi,0.
We let T denote the trader with τ units of G2i−1 and G2i each. We let y1 denote the demand of G2i−1,
and y2 to denote the demand of G2i from T . Then y1(1 + x) + y2(1− x) = 2τ and by (18) we have
y1
y2
=
(
1− x
1 + x
)1/(1+r)
Now assume without loss of generality that x > 0, we will show that x = O(1/n3). To this end, we have
y2 =
2τ
(1− x) + (1− x)1/(1+r)(1 + x)r/(1+r) ≤ τ +O(n)
which follows from the assumption of pi being an additively approximate equilibrium. It then follows that
(1− x)1/(1+r) ≥ (1 + x)1/(1+r) −O(1/n3) > 1−O(1/n3)
Since r is a positive constant, we have x = O(1/n3) and the lemma follows.
From now on we set N = n6. Recall the definition of AN , BN , CN , B′N , C
′
N , and SN from (24). Using
Lemma 21, we have xi,0 ∈ SN . Next we show that xi,j ∈ SN for all i and j.
Lemma 22. If pi is an -additively approximate equilibrium, then xi,j ∈ SN for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m].
Lemma 22 follows directly from the following three lemmas by induction:
Lemma 23. For any i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], if xi,j−1 ∈ AN , then we have xi,j ∈ AN ∪BN ∪B′N .
Lemma 24. For any i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], if xi,j−1 ∈ BN , then we have xi,j ∈ BN ∪ CN ;
and if xi,j−1 ∈ B′N then we have xi,j ∈ B′N ∪ C ′N
Lemma 25. For any i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m], if xi,j−1 ∈ CN , then we have xi,j ∈ CN ;
and if xi,j−1 ∈ C ′N , then we have xi,j ∈ C ′N .
Proof of Lemma 23. First we scale pi so that pii,j = 2. We let x denote xi,j , so that the prices of pi(G2i−1,j)
and pi(G2i,j) are 1 + x and 1− x, respectively. We also let
y = xi,j−1, pi(G2i−1,j−1) = 1 + y1 and pi(G2i,j−1) = 1− y2
By Lemma 19, y1 and y2 are both y ±O(m). The excess spending of G2i−1,j of the whole market is
µ · f(x) + n(1 + y1)− n(1 + x) = n(1/λ)(f(x)− λx+ λy1) = n(1/λ)(g(x) + λy1) (26)
while the excess spending of G2i,j of the whole market is
− µ · f(x) + n(1− y2)− n(1− x) = −n(1/λ)(g(x) + λy2) (27)
As pii,j = 2 and pi is an -additively approximate equilibrium, both (26) and (27) are at most O(). Thus∣∣n(1/λ)(g(x) + λy)∣∣ = O(nm) ⇒ |g(x) + λy | = O(m) (28)
as λ is a positive constant. As |y| = |xi,j−1| ≤ 1/N = 1/n6 and m = 1/n7, we have |g(x)| = O(1/N).
The lemma now follows from Corollary 3 and Corollary 5.
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Proof of Lemma 24. Suppose that xi,j−1 ∈ BN ; the proof for the case of xi,j−1 ∈ B′N is similar. Using the
same notation and argument of Lemma 23, we start with (28) and get
g(x) ≥ −λy −O(m) ≥ −λ(θ − 1/N +O(m)) > −λθ
where the second inequality used y = xi,j−1 ∈ BN and thus, y ≤ θ − 1/N . We also have
g(x) ≤ −λy +O(m) ≤ −λ/N +O(m) < 0
where the second inequality used y = xi,j−1 ≥ 1/N . By Corollary 3, we have x ∈ AN ∪BN ∪ CN .
Assume for contradiction that x ∈ AN , then by Corollary 5 we have
−λ/N +O(m) ≥ g(x) ≥ −λx/2
and thus, x ≥ 2/N −O(m) /∈ AN and we get a contradiction. The lemma now follows.
Proof of Lemma 25. Suppose that xi,j−1 ∈ CN ; the proof for the case of xi,j−1 ∈ C ′N is similar. Using the
same notation and argument of Lemma 23, we start with (28) and get
O(m) = |g(x) + λy | = |g(x) + λθ ± λ/N |
and thus, we have the following upper bound
|g(x) + λθ| ≤ λ/N +O(m)
The right side is smaller than (λ− σ/2)/N as N = n6,  = 1/n14 and m = n7. It follows from Lemma 16
that x ∈ CN . The lemma follows directly.
We now construct a 2n-dimensional vector y from pi as follows. Recall θ∗ is a γ-rational approximation
of θ with γ = 1/n7. Let δ = 1/N . For each i ∈ [n], if xi,m ≥ θ∗ − 2δ, then we set y2i−1 = 1 and y2i = 0;
if xi,m ≤ −(θ∗ − 2δ) then we set y2i−1 = 0 and y2i = 1; otherwise, we set y2i−1 and y2i to be
y2i−1 =
θ∗ + xi,m
2θ∗
and y2i =
θ∗ − xi,m
2θ∗
By definition, y is a nonnegative vector and y2i−1 + y2i = 1 for all i ∈ [n]. Note that when xi,m ∈ CN ,
we must have xi,m ≥ θ∗ − 2δ since γ < δ, and hence y2i−1 = 1 and y2i = 0. Similarly, if xi,m ∈ C ′N then
y2i−1 = 0 and y2i = 1. By Lemma 19, for every i ∈ [2n] we have
yi =
θ∗ + pi(Gi)− 1
2θ∗
± (O(γ +m+ 1/N)) ⇒ pi(Gi) = 2θ∗yi + (1− θ∗)±O(1/N)
To finish the proof of Theorem 6, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 10. When n is sufficiently large, y built above is a (1/n)-well-supported Nash equilibrium of P.
To prove Theorem 10, we need the following key lemma:
Lemma 26. For every i ∈ [n], if xi,0 ∈ BN ∪ CN then we have xi,m ∈ CN , and y2i−1 = 1, y2i = 0.
Similarly, if xi,0 ∈ B′N ∪ C ′N then we have xi,m ∈ C ′N , and y2i−1 = 0, y2i = 1.
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Proof. By Lemma 25, we assume that xi,0 ∈ BN without loss of generality.
Now assume for contradiction that xi,m /∈ CN . By Lemma 25 again we have xi,j ∈ BN for all j ∈ [m].
This contradicts with the following lemma:
Lemma 27. For any j ∈ [m], if xi,j−1 and xi,j are both in BN , then we have xi,j = xi,j−1 + Ω(1/N).
Proof. Using the same notation and argument of Lemma 23, we start with (28) and get
g(xi,j) = −λxi,j−1 ±O(m)
Using Lemma 15, we have g(xi,j) + λxi,j = f(xi,j) = Ω(1/N) since xi,j ∈ BN . As a result, we get
−λxi,j + Ω(1/N) = g(xi,j) = −λxi,j−1 ±O(m)
and thus, xi,j = xi,j−1 + Ω(1/N) using m = n7 and  = 1/n14. The lemma then follows.
We get a contradiction from Lemma 27 because m = n7 and N = n6. Lemma 26 follows.
Finally we prove Theorem 10:
Proof of Theorem 10. We assume for contradiction that y constructed above is not a (1/n)-well-supported
Nash equilibrium of P. Without loss of generality, we assume that
yT ·P1 > yT ·P2 + 1/n (29)
where P1 and P2 denote the first and second columns of P, respectively, but y2 > 0. To reach a contradic-
tion, by Lemma 26, it suffices to show that (29) implies that x1,0 ∈ BN ∪ CN .
To this end, we first scale pi so that pi(G1) + pi(G2) = 2, and use x to denote x1,0. By Lemma 21, we
have pi(G1), pi(G2) = 1±O(1/n3) are very close to 1. By applying Walras’ law over the whole marketMP
and using the assumption that pi is an -additively approximate equilibrium, we have
 ≥ the excess demand of G1 (or G2) ≥ −O(mn) (30)
Now we compare the total money spent on G1 and G2, by all traders in MP except the one, denoted by
T , who owns τ units of G1 and G2 each. Here is the list of such traders:
1. For each i ∈ [2n], there is a (Pi,1, Hi : G1)-trader. The total money these traders spend on G1 is∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,1 · pi(Hi) =
∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,1 ·
(
2θ∗yi + (1− θ∗)±O(1/N)
)
2. For each i ∈ [2n], there is a (Pi,2, Hi : G2)-trader. The total money these traders spend on G2 is∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,2 · pi(Hi) =
∑
i∈[2n]
Pi,2 ·
(
2θ∗yi + (1− θ∗)±O(1/N)
)
3. There are one ((1− θ∗)r1, AUX1 : G1)-trader and one ((1− θ∗)r2, AUX1 : G2) trader.
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Recall the definition of r1 and r2 in (6). As a result, the total money these traders spend on G1 is
M1 = 2θ
∗ · yT ·P1 + 2n(1− θ∗)±O(n/N)
using N = n6 and m = 1/n7, and the total money these traders spend on G2 is
M2 = 2θ
∗ · yT ·P2 + 2n(1− θ∗)±O(n/N)
Thus M1 −M2 = Ω(1/n) and the demand for G1 is larger than the demand for G2, from these traders, by
M1
pi(G1)
− M2
pi(G2)
≥ M2 + Ω(1/n)
pi(G1)
− M2
(1−O(1/n3)) · pi(G1) = Ω(1/n)
where both inequalities used pi(G1), pi(G2) = 1±O(1/n3) and M1,M2 = O(n).
Let d1 (or d2) denote the demand of G1 (or G2, respectively) from T . Using (30) and mn  1/n we
must have d2 − d1 = Ω(1/n). On the other hand, we have from (18):
d1
d2
=
(
1− x
1 + x
)1/(1+r)
As pi(G1), pi(G2) are close to 1, d1 and d2 are O(τ) even if T spends all the budget on one of them. Thus,(
1 + x
1− x
)1/(1+r)
=
d2
d1
= 1 +
d2 − d1
d1
= 1 + Ω(1/n5)
and thus, x = Ω(1/n5). It follows from Lemma 21 and N = n6 that x ∈ BN . The theorem follows.
5 Membership in FIXP
We are given a marketM with n traders andm goods. Each trader Ti, i ∈ [n], has an endowmentwi,j ≥ 0 of
each good j ∈ [m], and has a CES utility with coefficients αi,j ≥ 0 and parameter ρi < 1. The endowments
wi,j and coefficients αi,j are rationals given in binary and the parameters ρi < 1 are rationals given in unary;
the parameter ρi’s for different traders may be the same or different, and there may be a mixture of positive
and negative ρi’s. We also assume that the economy graph is strongly connected.
We prove the following theorem in this section:
Theorem 11. CES is in FIXP.
We first introduce some notation:
• Let wmin = mini,j {wi,j : wi,j > 0} and wmax = maxi,j {wij} be respectively the minimum
non-zero and the maximum endowment of a good, i.e., if a trader owns a good then he owns at
least wmin and at most wmax units of this good.
• Let αmin = mini,j {αi,j : αi,j > 0} and αmax = maxi,j {αij} be respectively the minimum
non-zero and the maximum CES coefficient over utilities of all traders.
• Finally, let µ = (hm/m)tm , where
t = max
(
{d1− ρie : ρi < 0} ∪ {d1/(1− ρi)e : ρi > 0}
)
and h =
αmin
αmax
· wmin
wmax
· 1
2nm2
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Without loss of generality we focus on price vectors pi that are normalized, i.e., the entries sum to 1. Let
S =
{
pi ∈ Rm+ :
∑m
i=1 pii = 1
}
be the unit simplex in the m-dimensional space. To prove membership in FIXP, given a market M we will
construct in polynomial time an algebraic circuit C with operations from{
+,−, ∗, /,max,min, k√ }
with m inputs and m outputs, which defines a continuous function F : S → S such that the fixed points of
F coincide with the market equilibria of M . As F is continuous on S which is convex and compact, a fixed
point always exists because of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. We also point out that in the construction, the
k’s in the k√ operations are encoded in unary.
Given an input vector pi ∈ S, the circuit C first computes µ, and then computes a new vector pˆi, where
pˆij = max(pij , µ) for all j ∈ [m]. Then it computes and outputs for each j ∈ [m]:
Fj(pi) =
pˆij + max{0, Zj(pˆi)}∑m
k=1(pˆik + max {0, Zk(pˆi)})
where we use Zj(pˆi) to denote the excess demand of the jth good at pˆi in M .
Note first that µ can be generated by the circuit C with only a polynomial number of operations. This is
because for any number c, we can generate c` with O(log(`)) multiplications by using successive squaring.
Hence, we can generate µ from hm/m using O(m log t) multiplications, from which we then compute the
new vector pˆi. From pˆi, the excess demand Zk(pˆi) can be computed using (1) with a polynomial number of
operations (it is important here that FIXP allows roots and hence fractional powers), and so can F (pi).
Note that all the operations of C are well-defined. In particular, all the fractional powers are applied to
positive numbers and all the denominators are positive. The map F is clearly continuous. Furthermore, we
have
∑
j Fj(pi) = 1 and Fj(pi) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [m]. Thus, F is a map from S to itself.
Next we show that the fixed points of F are precisely the market equilibria of M in the unit simplex S.
We need the following key lemma, which we will prove later.
Lemma 28. Let pi be a price vector with
∑m
j=1 pij ≥ 1 and suppose that pii ≤ µ for some good i. Then
there must be a good ` ∈ [m] for which Z`(pi) > nmwmax.
Using this lemma we prove the following theorem. Theorem 11 then follows.
Theorem 12. The fixed points of F are precisely the market equilibria of M in S.
Proof. Assume pi ∈ S is an equilibrium of M . Then pij > µ for all j by Lemma 28, and hence pˆi = pi and
Zj(pˆi) = Zj(pi) = 0 for all j. Therefore, Fj(pi) = pij for all j and pi is a fixed point of F .
Now let pi be a fixed point of F . We first show that pij > µ for all j ∈ [m].
Suppose that there is a good i with pii ≤ µ. From
∑m
j=1 pij = 1 and pˆij ≥ pij , we have
∑m
j=1 pˆij ≥ 1.
Then because of Lemma 28 there is a good ` with Z`(pˆi) > nmwmax. We partition the goods into two sets
H = {j : pij > µ} and L = {j : pij ≤ µ}. Since pi is a fixed point, from the definition of F we get
max
{
0, Zj(pˆi)
} ≥ pij m∑
k=1
max
{
0, Zk(pˆi)
}
, for every good j in H .
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From Z`(pˆi) > nmwmax we get
∑m
k=1 max {0, Zk(pˆi)} > 0. Therefore, we have Zj(pˆi) > 0 for all j ∈ H .
Moreover, note that the excess demand of any good cannot be less than −nwmax because each trader owns
at most wmax units of any good. Combining these we get:
m∑
j=1
pˆij · Zj(pˆi) =
∑
j∈H
pˆij · Zj(pˆi) +
∑
j∈L
µ · Zj(pˆi) ≥ pˆi` · Z`(pˆi)−
∑
j∈L
µ · nwmax > 0
However, by Warlas’ law,
∑m
j=1 pˆij · Zj(pˆi) = 0, a contradiction. Therefore, pij > µ for all j and pˆi = pi.
Finally, assume pi is not an equilibrium, i.e., Z`(pi) > 0 for some `. Then
∑m
k=1 max {0, Zk(pi)} > 0.
For any good j we have Fj(pˆi) = Fj(pi) = pij > µ and from the definition of F we get
max {0, Zj(pi)} = pij
∑m
k=1 max {0, Zk(pi)} > 0
and thus, Zj(pi) > 0 for all j. Therefore,
∑m
j=1 pij ·Zj(pi) > 0 which again violates Walras’ law. It follows
that pi must be a market equilibrium of M , and the theorem is proven.
It remains to prove Lemma 28. We show first the following lemma.
Lemma 29. If the economy graph contains an edge q → j such that pij ≤ ht · pitq, then there is a good `
with excess demand Z`(pi) > nmwmax.
Proof. Suppose that the excess demand Zj(pi) ≤ nmwmax, for all goods j. Since the total supply of every
good is at most nwmax, this implies that the total demand for every good is less than 2nmwmax.
Suppose that the economy graph has an edge q → j such that pij ≤ ht · pitq, and let Ti denote a trader
with wi,q > 0 and αi,j > 0. We may assume, without loss of generality, that good j has the lowest price
among those goods that Ti is interested in, i.e., that pij ≤ pik for all k such that αi,k > 0. (If not, then let
` = arg min
k
{
pik : αi,k > 0
}
and consider the edge q → ` instead of q → j; clearly pi` also satisfies pi` ≤ ht · pitq.) We distinguish two
cases depending on the sign of ρi.
• Case 1: ρi < 0. Using (1), and since ρi < 0, we have
xi,j =
α
1
1−ρi
i,j ·
∑m
k=1wi,k · pik
pi
1
1−ρi
j ·
∑m
k=1 α
1
1−ρi
i,k · pi
−ρi
1−ρi
k
≥ α
1
1−ρi
min · wmin · piq
pi
1
1−ρi
j ·m · α
1
1−ρi
max
We must have xi,j < 2nmwmax. Thus, solving for pij and using the fact that ρi < 0 and t ≥ 1− ρi:
pij >
αmin
αmax
·
(
wmin
wmax
· 1
2nm2
)1−ρi
· pi1−ρiq ≥ ht · pitq
• Case 2: ρi > 0. Using (1), and since ρi > 0 and pij ≤ pik for all k such that αi,k > 0, we have:
xi,j =
α
1
1−ρi
i,j ·
∑m
k=1wi,k · pik
pi
1
1−ρi
j ·
∑m
k=1 α
1
1−ρi
i,k · pi
−ρi
1−ρi
k
≥ α
1
1−ρi
min · wmin · piq
pi
1
1−ρi
j ·m · α
1
1−ρi
max · pi
−ρi
1−ρi
j
≥
(
αmin
αmax
) 1
1−ρi · wmin
m
· piq
pij
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From xi,j < 2nmwmax, solving for pij and using the fact that ρi > 0 and t ≥ 1/(1− ρi) > 1:
pij >
(
αmin
αmax
) 1
1−ρi · wmin
wmax
· 1
2nm2
· piq > ht · pitq
Combining the two cases, the lemma is now proven.
We can prove now Lemma 28:
Proof of Lemma 28. Let pi be a price vector with
∑m
j=1 pij ≥ 1. If a good j has pij = 0, then it has infinite
demand. So assume without loss of generality that pij > 0 for all j. Suppose that all goods j have excess
demand Zj(pi) ≤ nmwmax. Then pij > ht · pitq, for all edges q → j by Lemma 29.
We use Gmax and Gmin to denote a good with the maximum and minimum price, respectively. We also
use pimax and pimin to denote their prices, respectively. Because the economy graph is strongly connected, it
contains a simple path from Gmax to Gmin. Let
Gmax = j0 → j1 → j2 → . . .→ j` = Gmin
be one such simple path. By Lemma 29 we have pijk > h
t · pitjk−1 for k = 1, . . . , `. Therefore, we have
pimin = pij` > h
`t` · pit`j0 = h`t
` · pit`max
by induction on k. As the path is simple, ` ≤ m. Also, since pimax is the maximum price and
∑
j pij ≥ 1,
we have pimax ≥ 1/m. It then follows from the definition of µ that
pimin > (h
m · pimax)tm ≥ (hm/m)t
m
= µ
and the lemma follows.
6 Membership in PPAD
We focus on CES markets with n traders, m goods, and strongly connected economy graphs. Each trader Ti
uses a CES utility function, with its coefficients αi,j’s encoded in binary and its parameter ρi < 1 encoded
in unary. Again we allow traders to use different ρi’s. We prove the following theorem in this section.
Theorem 13. CES-APPROX is in PPAD.
We use the definition of wmin, wmax, αmin and αmax in Section 5. For convenience, we assume without
loss of generality that wmin ≤ wmax = 1 and 1 = αmin ≤ αmax, since scaling the αi,j’s and wi,j’s does not
change the set of -approximate market equilibria (as the approximation here is multiplicative).
The following lemma implies that we may assume without loss of generality that there is a trader in the
market who owns a positive amount of all m goods and is interested in all of them.
Lemma 30. Let M be a market with n traders and m goods. For any  : 0 <  < 1, we construct from M a
market M ′ by adding a new trader T ∗ who initially owns wmin/4 units of each good; and equally likes all
the m goods with a CES function of parameter ρ∗ = −1. Then any (/4)-approximate equilibrium of M ′ is
also an -approximate equilibrium of M .
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Proof. Let pi denote an (/4)-approximate equilibrium of M ′. We let Zj(pi) and Z ′j(pi) denote the excess
demand of good j under pricing pi in M and M ′, respectively. By the definition of approximate equilibria,
Z ′j(pi) ≤

4
·
(
n∑
i=1
wi,j +
wmin
4
)
=

4
·
n∑
i=1
wi,j +
2wmin
16
for all j. At the same price vector pi, all traders in M have the same demands as in M ′ but trader T ∗ is not
present anymore to provide wmin/4 units of supply of each good j. This implies that for each good j:
Zj(pi) = Z
′
j(pi)−
(
demand of j from T ∗ in M ′
)
+ wmin
/
4 ≤ Z ′j(pi) + wmin
/
4
Combining the two inequalities, we have for each good j:
Zj(pi) ≤ 
4
·
n∑
i=1
wi,j +
2wmin
16
+
wmin
4
< 
n∑
i=1
wi,j
where the last inequality follows from
∑n
i=1wi,j ≥ wmin, as the economy graph is strongly connected and
thus, at least one trader owns good j. It follows that pi is an -approximate equilibrium of M .
As a result, from now on, we always assume that there is a trader T ∗ in the input market M , who owns
wmin units of each good (notice that after adding T ∗ to M as described in Lemma 30, one needs to update
wmin) and equally likes all the goods (i.e., all coefficients are 1) with a CES function of ρ∗ = −1. Let
ξ =
(wmin
4nm
)2
It is clear that ξ : 0 < ξ < 1 can be computed efficiently. Now we prove the following useful lemma:
Lemma 31. Given a vector pi with 1 ≤∑mj=1 pij ≤ 2, if pi` ≤ ξ for some ` then Z`(pi) > n.
Proof. As T ∗ is equally interested in all the goods and ρ∗ = −1, by (1) his demand for good ` is
1√
pi`
·
∑m
k=1wmin · pik∑m
k=1
√
pik
>
1
ξ1/2
· wmin
2m
= 2n
where we used 1 ≤∑mj=1 pij ≤ 2. The lemma follows as the supply of good ` is at most nwmax = n.
Let S denote the unit simplex in the m-dimensional space and pˆij = max(pij , ξ), for all j ∈ [m]. We are
going to use the following continuous map F : S → S with
Fj(pi) =
pˆij + max {0, Zj(pˆi)}∑m
k=1(pˆik + max {0, Zk(pˆi)})
(31)
We need the following definition of approximate fixed points:
Definition 11 (Approximate Fixed Points). We say pi ∈ S is a c-approximate fixed point of F : S → S for
some c ≥ 0, if ‖F (pi)− pi‖ ≤ c, where we use ‖·‖ to denote the L∞ norm of a vector.
We prove that every c-approximate fixed point of F , where c = ξwmin/2, is an -approximate equilib-
rium of market M .
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Lemma 32. When 0 <  < 1, any c-approximate fixed point pi of F is an -approximate equilibrium of M
where c = ξwmin/2.
Proof. First we show that pij ≥ ξ for all j ∈ [m]. Assume for contradiction that pi` < ξ for some `.
We divide the traders into two groups: H = {j : pij > ξ} and L = {j : pij ≤ ξ}. Then L is nonempty
by our assumption since ` ∈ L. By Lemma 31, Zj(pˆi) > n for all j ∈ L, since
∑
j∈[m] pˆij is between 1 and
1 + nξ < 2. On the other hand, because pi is a c-approximate fixed point, for each good j we have
pˆij + max
{
0, Zj(pˆi)
} ≥ (pij − c) · m∑
k=1
(
pˆik + max
{
0, Zk(pˆi)
})
(32)
For each good j ∈ H , we have pˆij = pij > ξ. Using
∑m
k=1 pˆik ≥ 1, we have for each good j ∈ H:
max
{
0, Zj(pˆi)
} ≥ −c+ (pij − c) m∑
k=1
max
{
0, Zk(pˆi)
}
> −c+ (ξ − c)n > 0
by the definition of c and the assumption that wmin ≤ wmax = 1. This contradicts with Walras’ law.
Now pij ≥ ξ for all j. Assume for contradiction pi = pˆi is not an -approximate equilibrium. Then
m∑
k=1
max
{
0, Zk(pˆi)
}
=
m∑
k=1
max
{
0, Zk(pi)
}
> wmin
Since pi is a c-approximate fixed point of F , using (32) we have for each good j ∈ [m]:
max
{
0, Zj(pi)
} ≥ −c+ (pij − c)wmin ≥ −c+ (ξ − c)wmin = c(1− wmin) > 0
since  < 1 and wmin ≤ 1. This again contradicts with Walras’ law. The lemma then follows.
Thus, the approximate market equilibrium problem reduces to the approximate fixed point computation
problem for the functions (31) that arise from CES markets.
Let F be a family of functions, where each function F in F is represented (encoded) by a binary string.
Denote by FI the function represented by string I , and assume that every FI in the family F is a continuous
function whose domain and range is a convex polytope DI , described by a set of linear inequalities all with
rational coefficients that can be computed from the string I in polynomial time.
An example of such a family is the family FCES of functions in equation (31) which correspond to CES
markets; every CES market (represented by its string encoding) induces a corresponding function from the
unit simplex S to itself given in (31).
Given a function FI from F we define its size, denoted size(FI), to be the length |I| of the string I . As
usual, we define also the size of a rational number r, denoted size(r), to be the number of bits in the binary
representation of r. We will show that the family FCES has the following two crucial properties, and that for
every family of functions that has these properties, the problem of computing an approximate fixed point is
in PPAD. Theorem 13 will then follow.
Definition 12 (Polynomially Continuous Families). We say that a family of functions F is polynomially
continuous if there is a polynomial q such that for every FI ∈ F and every rational c > 0, there is a
rational δ such that log(1/δ) ≤ q(|I|+ size(c)) and such that ‖x− y‖ ≤ δ implies ‖FI(x)− FI(y)‖ ≤ c
for any x,y ∈ DI .
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Definition 13 (Approximately Polynomially Computable Families). We say that a family of functions F
is approximately polynomially computable if there is a polynomial q and an algorithm which, given (the
string encoding I of ) a function FI ∈ F , a rational vector x ∈ DI and a rational number c > 0, computes
a vector y that satisfies ‖FI(x)− y‖ ≤ c in time q(|I|+ size(x) + size(c)).
It was shown in [EY10] that, if a family of functions is both polynomially continuous and polynomially
computable, then the following problem, called the Weak Approximation problem, is in PPAD: Given (the
string encoding I of) a function FI ∈ F and a rational number c > 0 (in binary), compute a c-approximate
fixed point of F . We show that the same is true if F is approximately polynomially computable.
Theorem 14. If a family of functions F is polynomially continuous and approximately polynomially com-
putable then the weak approximation problem for F (i.e. given rational c > 0 and function F ∈ F compute
a c-approximate fixed point of F ) is in PPAD.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.2, Part 2, in [EY10].
First, from Lemma 2.1 of [EY10], the problem can be reduced to the case where all the functions in F
have a unit simplex as their domain and range, so we assume this is the case from now on.
Let F ∈ F be a given function (represented by its string encoding) that maps the unit simplex S in Rm+
to itself, and c > 0 a given rational number, where c < 1 without loss of generality. By Definition 12, we
can pick an integer N with polynomially many bits in size(F ) and size(c/3m) such that δ = 1/N satisfies
both δ < c/(3m) and the following condition:
‖F (x)− F (y)‖ < c/(3m), for all x,y ∈ S that satisfy ‖x− y‖ < δ.
We discretize S into a regular simplicial decomposition [Kuh68] with the following set of vertices T :
T =
{
p ∈ S : each pi is a multiple of 1/N
}
For each p ∈ T , we define g(p) to be the output of the algorithm from Definition 13, given (the encoding I
of) F , vector p and c/(9m2). We can assume, without loss of generality, that g(p) ≥ 0. As g(p) may not
lie on the unit simplex S, we scale it to a vector f(p) = g(p)/
∑
k gk(p) that lies on S. We have:
|Fi(p)− fi(p)| =
∣∣∣∣Fi(p)(∑k gk(p))− gi(p)∑
k gk(p)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (m+ 1)c/(9m2)1−mc/(9m2) ≤ c3m
for every i ∈ [m]. Therefore, ‖F (p)− f(p)‖ ≤ c/(3m) and f(p) ∈ S for all p ∈ T .
We consider the following m-coloring on T :
Vertex p is colored i ∈ [m] if f(p) 6= p and i is the smallest coordinate such that
fi(p) < pi, or f(p) = p and i is the smallest coordinate such that pi = maxj pj .
Note that for any p ∈ T , if f(p) 6= p then at least one of the coordinates satisfies fi(p) < pi, since p and
f(p) are both in S and their coordinates sum to 1. Hence, the coloring rule above is well defined. Note also
that the m unit vectors ei, i ∈ [m], at the corners of the unit simplex S are labeled i, and all the vertices of
T on the facet pi = 0 are labeled with a color 6= i. Hence, this m-coloring of T satisfies the conditions of
Sperner’s Lemma and therefore a panchromatic simplex of diameter 1/N must exist, i.e., a simplex whose
m vertices have different colors.
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It is known that finding a panchromatic simplex of the regular simplicial decomposition of S in such an
m-coloring that satisfies Sperner’s Lemma is in PPAD, e.g., using the method described in [EY10]. Now it
suffices to prove that one of the vertices of a panchromatic simplex is a c-approximate fixed point of F .
For this purpose, consider a panchromatic simplex with the following m vertices p1, . . . ,pm. Assume,
without loss of generality, that pi is colored i for all i. We next prove that any point p ∈ {p1, . . . ,pm} is
a c-approximate fixed point of F . First notice that fi(pi) ≤ pii for all i ∈ [m] since pi is colored i. Since
‖pi − p‖ ≤ δ, we have
Fi(p)− pi = Fi(p)− Fi(pi) + Fi(pi)− fi(pi) + fi(pi)− pii + pii − pi ≤
c
m
and hence, Fi(p) ≤ pi + c/m for every i ∈ [m].
On the other hand, as
∑
i Fi(p) =
∑
i pi = 1, if we sum the previous inequalities for all i 6= j, we get
1− Fj(p) ≤ 1− pj + c
and thus, Fj(p) ≥ pj − c for all j ∈ [m]. It follows that p is a c-approximate fixed point of F .
We show now that the family FCES for the CES markets satisfies the two conditions of Theorem 14.
Lemma 33. The family FCES is polynomially continuous.
Proof. Let M be a given CES market and F ∈ FCES the corresponding function given in (31). First, we let
r be the largest positive ρi in the market, with r = 0 when all ρi’s are negative. Since each trader can only
use a nonzero ρi < 1, we have r < 1.
Let pi,pi′ ∈ S denote two vectors with ‖pi − pi′‖ ≤ δ for some parameter δ > 0 satisfying
h =
δ
ξ(1− r) <
1
4
(33)
but to be specified later. Let y = pˆi and z = pˆi′ then we have yj , zj ≥ ξ for all j and ‖y − z‖ ≤ δ. Let xi,j
and x′i,j denote the demand of good j from trader i at y and z, respectively.
For any δ > 0 satisfying (33), we will prove the following inequality:∣∣xi,j − x′i,j∣∣ ≤ q, where q = 5m2h · ξ r−41−r · (αmax) 21−r (34)
Assume this inequality holds. Notice that
∣∣Zj(y)− Zj(z)∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
(xi,j − x′i,j)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
n∑
i=1
∣∣xi,j − x′i,j∣∣ ≤ nq
Recall the definition of the function F . For each j, we have
Fj(pi) =
yj + max {0, Zj(y)}∑m
k=1(yk + max {0, Zk(y)})
Replacing pi,y with pi′, z, the change in the numerator is at most δ + nq. The change in the denominator is
at most mδ + nmq. Now we show that if δ is small enough so that (33) and the following hold:
δ + nq ≤ cξ/3 and mδ + nmq ≤ c/3 (35)
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then ‖F (pi)−F (pi′)‖ ≤ c. To see this, assume without loss of generality that Fj(pi′) > Fj(pi), for some j.
Since the numerator of Fj(pi) is at least ξ and the denominator of Fj(pi) is at least 1, we have
Fj(pi
′)− Fj(pi) < Fj(pi) · 1 + c/3
1− c/3 − Fj(pi) ≤ Fj(pi) · c ≤ c
Because all ρi’s are given in unary, 1/(1− r) can be bounded from above by size(M). It is now clear that
δ satisfies (33) and (35) when log(1/δ) is polynomially large in size(M) + size(c), for some large enough
polynomial. We now prove inequality (34).
Using (1) we have the following explicit form of |xi,j − x′i,j | (we let ρ denote ρi for convenience):
α
1
1−ρ
i,j ·
∣∣∣∣(∑mk=1wi,k · yk)(z 11−ρj ∑mk=1 α 11−ρi,k · z −ρ1−ρk )− (∑mk=1wi,k · zk)(y 11−ρj ∑mk=1 α 11−ρi,k · y −ρ1−ρk )∣∣∣∣(
y
1
1−ρ
j
∑m
k=1 α
1
1−ρ
i,k · y
−ρ
1−ρ
k
)(
z
1
1−ρ
j
∑m
k=1 α
1
1−ρ
i,k · z
−ρ
1−ρ
k
)
We start with a few easy bounds that work for both positive and negative ρ. First, using 1/(1− ρ) > 0:
α
1/(1−ρ)
i,j ≥ α1/(1−ρ)min = 1
since αmin = 1; and α
1/(1−ρ)
i,j ≤ (αmax)1/(1−r). Let β denote a number in [ξ, 1], then β1/(1−ρ) ≤ 1 and
β1/(1−ρ) ≥ ξ1/(1−ρ) ≥ ξ1/(1−r)
Note that this holds even when r = 0. Finally, we have
β−ρ/(1−ρ) ≤ ξ−r/(1−r) and β−ρ/(1−ρ) ≥ ξ
The first one follows from β ≤ 1 and β−ρ/(1−ρ) ≤ 1 when ρ < 0. The second follows similarly.
We will now bound the numerator. For this purpose we use the following two inequalities∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
wi,k · yk −
m∑
k=1
wi,k · zk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ δm (36)
and ∣∣∣∣∣ z 11−ρj
m∑
k=1
α
1
1−ρ
i,k · z
−ρ
1−ρ
k − y
1
1−ρ
j
m∑
k=1
α
1
1−ρ
i,k · y
−ρ
1−ρ
k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4mh · (αmax) 11−r · ξ −r1−r (37)
which we prove later. Using (36), (37) and |ab− cd| ≤ |(b− d)a|+ |(a− c)d|, the numerator is at most
(αmax)
1
1−r ·
(
4mh · (αmax)
1
1−r · ξ −r1−r ·
m∑
k=1
wi,k · yk + δm · z
1
1−ρ
j ·
m∑
k=1
α
1
1−ρ
i,k · zk
−ρ
1−ρ
)
(38)
Using ξ ≤ yk, zk ≤ 1, wi,k ≤ wmax = 1 and αi,k ≤ αmax, the last expression is at most
(αmax)
1
1−r ·
(
4m2h · (αmax)
1
1−r · ξ −r1−r + δm2 · (αmax)
1
1−r · ξ −r1−r
)
≤ 5m2h · (αmax)
2
1−r · ξ −r1−r
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using (33). The inequality (34) follows since the denominator is at least(
ξ
1
1−r · ξ
)2
= ξ
4−2r
1−r
It remains to prove the two inequalities (36) and (37). For (36) we have:∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
wi,k · yk −
m∑
k=1
wi,k · zk
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
m∑
k=1
wi,k · |yk − zk| ≤ δm
For (37) we first give an upper bound for |γ1/(1−ρ) − β1/(1−ρ) |, where β + δ ≥ γ ≥ β ≥ ξ and γ ≤ 1:
γ
1
1−ρ − β 11−ρ ≤ β 11−ρ
((
1 +
δ
β
) 1
1−ρ
− 1
)
≤
(
1 +
δ
β
) 1
1−ρ
− 1
since β ≤ γ ≤ 1 and 1/(1− ρ) > 0. By (33), we have δ/(ξ(1− ρ)) ≤ δ/(ξ(1− r)) ≤ 1/4 and thus,(
1 +
δ
β
) 1
1−ρ
− 1 ≤
(
1 +
δ
ξ
) 1
1−ρ
− 1 ≤ e δξ(1−ρ) − 1 ≤ 2δ
ξ(1− ρ) ≤
2δ
ξ(1− r) = 2h
where we used ex ≥ 1 + x ≥ ex/2 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1; and 1− ρ ≥ 1− r > 0.
We also need to give an upper bound for |γ−ρ/(1−ρ) − β−ρ/(1−ρ) |. When ρ > 0, we have
∣∣∣γ −ρ1−ρ − β −ρ1−ρ ∣∣∣ = γ −ρ1−ρ ∣∣∣∣∣1−
(
γ
β
) ρ
1−ρ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ξ −r1−r ·
((
1 +
δ
β
) ρ
1−ρ
− 1
)
By (33), we have δρ/(β(1− ρ)) ≤ δr/(ξ(1− r)) < 1/4 and thus, by the same argument∣∣∣γ −ρ1−ρ − β −ρ1−ρ ∣∣∣ ≤ ξ −r1−r · 2δr
ξ(1− r) < 2h · ξ
−r
1−r
On the other hand, when ρ < 0, we have
∣∣∣γ −ρ1−ρ − β −ρ1−ρ ∣∣∣ = β −ρ1−ρ ((γ
β
) −ρ
1−ρ
− 1
)
≤
(
1 +
δ
β
) −ρ
1−ρ
− 1 ≤ 2δ
β
≤ 2δ
ξ
≤ 2h
since 0 < −ρ/(1− ρ) < 1. Thus for both cases, 2h · ξ−r/(1−r) is a valid upper bound.
Using the second bound, we immediately have∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
k=1
α
1
1−ρ
i,k · z
−ρ
1−ρ
k −
m∑
k=1
α
1
1−ρ
i,k · y
−ρ
1−ρ
k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
m∑
k=1
α
1
1−ρ
i,k ·
∣∣∣∣z −ρ1−ρk − y −ρ1−ρk ∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2mh · (αmax) 11−r · ξ −r1−r (39)
Using the inequality on |ab− cd| ≤ |(b− d)a|+ |(a− c)d| again, the left side of (37) is at most
z
1
1−ρ
j · 2mh · (αmax)
1
1−r · ξ −r1−r + 2h ·
m∑
k=1
α
1
1−ρ
i,k · y
−ρ
1−ρ
k
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Plugging z
1
1−ρ
j ≤ 1 and y−ρ/(1−ρ)k ≤ ξ−r/(1−r), we can upperbound it by
2mh · (αmax)
1
1−r · ξ −r1−r + 2mh · (αmax)
1
1−r · ξ −r1−r = 4mh · (αmax)
1
1−r · ξ −r1−r
and (37) follows. The lemma is now proven.
We now show that FCES satisfies the second condition of Theorem 14.
Lemma 34. The family FCES is approximately polynomially computable.
Proof. Let M be a CES market and F be the corresponding function in (31). Let pi ∈ S be a given rational
vector in the unit simplex, and c > 0 be a given rational number, where c < 1 without loss of generality.
First we can clearly compute ξ and pˆi in polynomial time. From the definition of F and the fact that the
denominator of Fj is at least 1, it suffices to approximate the demand xi,j(pˆi) of each trader within (additive)
precision of, e.g., c/(2nm2). An easy calculation shows then that the approximate values for the Fj that we
derive will have error at most c.
For each xi,j , we use the explicit form in (1), applied to pˆi. Because all the prices in pˆi are at least ξ, we
have lower bounds for both the denominator and numerator of xi,j (e.g., see the proof of Lemma 33). With
these lower bounds it then suffices to approximate the rational powers of pˆik’s and αi,k’s in (1) to sufficient
precision. This can be done efficiently because the exponents are either 1/(1 − ρi) or −ρi/(1 − ρi) and ρi
is encoded in unary.
Theorem 13 now follows from Lemma 32, Theorem 14, Lemma 12, and Lemma 13. Using Lemma 32,
to compute an -approximate equilibrium of a market M , it suffices to compute a c-approximate fixed point
of the corresponding function F in (31), where c = ξwmin/2. By Lemmas 12 and 13, the family FCES of
functions (31) corresponding to CES markets is polynomially continuous and approximately polynomially
computable. Theorem 14 then implies that the problem of computing a c-approximate fixed point of F is in
PPAD, and hence so is the problem of computing an -approximate equilibrium of a CES market M .
7 PPAD-Completeness of Two-Strategy Polymatrix Games
In this section we prove Theorem 8. Membership in PPAD for the exact equilibrium problem (and thus the
approximation as well) was shown in [EY10], Corollary 5.3. The proof of its PPAD-hardness below follows
the techniques developed in [DGP09, CDT09].
7.1 Generalized Circuits and Their Assignment Problem
Syntactically, a generalized circuit S is a pair (V, T ), in which V is a set of nodes; and T is a set of gates.
Every gate T ∈ T is a 5-tuple T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) in which
1. G ∈ {Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+, G−, G<, G∧, G∨, G¬} is the type of the gate. Among the nine types of
gates, Gζ , G×ζ , G=, G+ and G− are arithmetic gates implementing arithmetic constraints. G< is
called a brittle comparator: it only distinguishes two values that are properly separated. Finally, G∧,
G∨ and G¬ are logic gates.
2. v1, v2 ∈ V ∪ {nil} are the first and second input nodes of the gate.
3. v ∈ V is the output node, and α ∈ R≥0 ∪ {nil}.
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G = Gζ : P[T, ] =
[
x[v] = α± 
]
G = G×ζ : P[T, ] =
[
x[v] = min
(
αx[v1], 1
)±  ]
G = G= : P[T, ] =
[
x[v] = min
(
x[v1], 1
)±  ]
G = G+ : P[T, ] =
[
x[v] = min
(
x[v1] + x[v2], 1
)±  ]
G = G− : P[T, ] =
[
min
(
x[v1]− x[v2], 1
)−  ≤ x[v] ≤ max (x[v1]− x[v2], 0)+  ]
G = G< : P[T, ] =
[
x[v] = B 1 if x[v1] < x[v2]− ; x[v] = B 0 if x[v1] > x[v2] + 
]
G = G∨ : P[T, ] =
[
x[v] = B 1 if x[v1] =

B 1 or x[v2] =

B 1
x[v] = B 0 if x[v1] =

B 0 and x[v2] =

B 0
]
G = G∧ : P[T, ] =
[
x[v] = B 0 if x[v1] =

B 0 or x[v2] =

B 0
x[v] = B 1 if x[v1] =

B 1 and x[v2] =

B 1
]
G = G¬ : P[T, ] =
[
x[v] = B 0 if x[v1] =

B 1; x[v] =

B 1 if x[v1] =

B 0
]
Table 1: Constraints P[T, ], where T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) and K = |V |
The set T of gates must satisfy the following important property:
No Conflict: For any gates T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) 6= T ′ = (G′, v′1, v′2, v′, α′) in T , we have v 6= v′.
Suppose T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) in T , then
1. If G = Gζ , then the gate has no input node and v1 = v2 = nil.
2. If G ∈ {G×ζ , G=, G¬}, then the gate has one input node: v1 ∈ V and v2 = nil.
3. If G ∈ {G+, G−, G<, G∧, G∨}, then the gate has two input nodes: v1, v2 ∈ V and v1 6= v2.
Moreover, the parameter α is only used in Gζ and G×ζ gates. If G = Gζ or G×ζ , then α ∈ [0, 1].
Semantically we associate each node v ∈ V with a real variable x[v]. Each gate T requires the variables
of its input and output nodes to satisfy a certain constraint, logical or arithmetic, depending on the type of T
(see Table 1 for the details of the constraints). Here the notation b = a±  means b ∈ [a− , a+ ] and the
notation = B is defined as follows. Given an assignment (x[v] : v ∈ V ) to the variables, we say the value of
x[v] represents Boolean 1 with precision , denoted by x[v] = B 1 if
1−  ≤ x[v] ≤ 1 + ;
it represents Boolean 0 with precision , denoted by x[v] = B 0 if 0 ≤ x[v] ≤ . One can see that the logic
constraints required by the three logic gates G∧, G∨ and G¬ are defined similarly to the classical ones.
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Definition 14. Suppose S = (V, T ) is a generalized circuit, where K = |V |. For  ≥ 0, an -approximate
solution to S is an assignment (x[v] : v ∈ V ) to the variables such that
0 ≤ x[v] ≤ 1 + , for all v ∈ V ;
and for each gate T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) ∈ T , the values of x[v1], x[v2] and x[v] must satisfy the constraint
P[T, ] defined in Table 1.
We use POLY-GCIRCUIT to denote the following problem: given a generalized circuit S with K nodes,
find an -approximate solution, where  = 1/K. It is known that:
Theorem 15. POLY-GCIRCUIT is PPAD-hard.
7.2 PPAD-Hardness of Two-Strategy Polymatrix Games
We present a polynomial-time reduction from POLY-GCIRCUIT to POLYMATRIX.
Let S = (V, T ) be a generalized circuit with K = |V |. Let C be an arbitrary bijection from V to
{1, 3, . . . , 2K − 3, 2K − 1}
Let n = 2K. We construct from S a 2n× 2n matrix
P =
(
0 B
A 0
)
where A,B ∈ [0, 1]n×n, as follows
A =
∑
T∈T L[T ] and B =
∑
T∈T R[T ]
The construction of L[T ] and R[T ] can be found in Table 2. For each T ∈ T , it is easy to check that L[T ]
and R[T ] defined in Table 2 satisfy the following property.
Property 1. Let T = (G, v1, v2, v, α), L[T ] = (Li,j) and R[T ] = (Ri,j). Suppose C(v) = 2k − 1, then
j 6∈ {2k, 2k − 1} ⇒ Li,j = Ri,j = 0, ∀i ∈ [2K];
j ∈ {2k, 2k − 1} ⇒ 0 ≤ Li,j , Ri,j ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [2K].
Corollary 6. A,B ∈ [0, 1]n×n and P ∈ [0, 1]2n×2n.
We denote an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of P, where  = 1/n < 1/K, by a pair of n-dimen-
sional vectors (x,y), instead of a single 2n-dimensional vector. For each node v ∈ V , we let x[v] = x2k−1
where 2k − 1 = C(v). As  < 1/K, PPAD-hardness of POLYMATRIX follows from the following lemma:
Lemma 35. (x[v] : v ∈ V ) is an -approximate solution to the generalized circuit S.
It is clear that 0 ≤ x[v] ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V simply because x2k−1 + x2k = 1 for all k ∈ [K].
So to prove Lemma 35, it suffices to show that (x[v] : v ∈ V ) satisfies all the constraints P[T, ].
Lemma 36 (Constraints P [T, ]). Let (x,y) be an -well-supported Nash equilibrium of P, then for each
gate T ∈ T , (x[v] : v ∈ V ) satisfies the constraint P[T, ] defined in Table 1.
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Matrices L[T ] and R[T ], where T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) is a gate in T
Set L[T ] and R[T ] to be the zero matrix. Let 2k − 1 = C(v), 2k1 − 1 = C(v1) and 2k2 − 1 = C(v2):
Gζ : L2k−1,2k = L2k,2k−1 = R2k−1,2k−1 = 1, Ri,2k = α/K, ∀ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K
G×ζ : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k−1,2k = 1, R2k1−1,2k−1 = α
G= : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k−1,2k = 1
G+ : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k−1 = R2k−1,2k = 1
G− : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k = R2k−1,2k = 1
G< : L2k−1,2k = L2k,2k−1 = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k = 1
G∨ : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k−1 = 1, Ri,2k = 1/(2K), ∀ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K
G∧ : L2k−1,2k−1 = L2k,2k = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k2−1,2k−1 = 1, Ri,2k = 3/(2K), ∀ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K
G¬ : L2k−1,2k = L2k,2k−1 = R2k1−1,2k−1 = R2k1,2k = 1
Table 2: Matrices L[T ] and R[T ]
Proof. Let T = (G, v1, v2, v, α) be a gate in T , with C(v) = 2k − 1. Let Ai, Li, Bi, and Ri denote ith
column vector of A,B,L[T ] and R[T ], respectively. By Property 1, L[T ] and R[T ] are the only two gadget
matrices that modify the entries in columns A2k−1,A2k or columns B2k−1, B2k. Thus, we have
A2k−1 = L2k−1, A2k = L2k, B2k−1 = R2k−1 and B2k = R2k (40)
We start with the addition gate G = G+. Let C(v1) = 2k1 − 1 and C(v2) = 2k2 − 1. We need to show
x[v] = min(x[v1] + x[v2], 1)± 
From (40) and Table 2, we have
x ·B2k−1 − x ·B2k = x ·R2k−1 − x ·R2k = x[v1] + x[v2]− x[v] (41)
y ·A2k−1 − y ·A2k = y · L2k−1 − y · L2k = y2k−1 − y2k (42)
In a proof by contradiction, we consider two cases. First, assume x[v] > min(x[v1] + x[v2], 1) + . Since
x[v] ≤ 1, the assumption would imply x[v] > x[v1] + x[v2] + . From Equation (41) and the definition of
-well-supported Nash equilibria, we have y2k−1 = 0 and y2k = 1. By combining this with (42), we finally
get x[v] = x2k−1 = 0, contradicting our assumption that x[v] > x[v1] + x[v2] +  > 0.
Next, we assume x[v] < min(x[v1] + x[v2], 1) −  ≤ x[v1] + x[v2] − . Then, Equation (41) implies
that y2k = 0 and y2k−1 = 1. By Equation (42), we have x2k = 0 and x[v] = x2k−1 = 1, contradicting our
assumption that x[v] < min(x[v1] + x[v2], 1)−  ≤ 1− .
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Proof for Gζ Gates. From (40) and Table 2, we have
x ·B2k−1 − x ·B2k = x ·R2k−1 − x ·R2k = x[v]− α
y ·A2k−1 − y ·A2k = y · L2k−1 − y · L2k = y2k − y2k−1
If x[v] > α + , then from the first equation, we have y2k = 0 and y2k−1 = 1. But by the second equation
we have x[v] = x2k−1 = 0, which contradicts our assumption that x[v] > α+  > 0.
If x[v] < α− , then from the first equation, we have y2k−1 = 0 and y2k = 1. But the second equation
implies x2k = 0 and x[v] = x2k−1 = 1, contradicting the assumption that x[v] < α−  and α ≤ 1.
Proof for G×ζ Gates. From (40) and Table 2, we have
x ·B2k−1 − x ·B2k = x ·R2k−1 − x ·R2k = α · x[v1]− x[v]
y ·A2k−1 − y ·A2k = y · L2k−1 − y · L2k = y2k−1 − y2k
If x[v] > min(αx[v1], 1) + , then we have x[v] > αx[v1] +  as x[v] = x2k−1 ≤ 1. By the first equation,
we have y2k−1 = 0 and y2k = 1. The second equation implies that x[v] = x2k−1 = 0, which contradicts
the assumption that x[v] > min(αx[v1], 1) +  > 0.
If x[v] < min(αx[v1], 1)−  ≤ αx[v1]− , then the first equation implies that y2k = 0 and y2k−1 = 1.
From the second equation we have x2k = 0 and x[v] = x2k−1 = 1, which contradicts the assumption that
x[v] < min(αx[v1], 1)−  ≤ 1− .
Proof for G= Gates. G= is a special case of G×ζ with parameter α = 1.
Proof for G− Gates. From (40) and Table 2, we have
x ·B2k−1 − x ·B2k = x ·R2k−1 − x ·R2k = x[v1]− x[v2]− x[v]
y ·A2k−1 − y ·A2k = y · L2k−1 − y · L2k = y2k−1 − y2k
If x[v] > max(x[v1]− x[v2], 0) +  ≥ x[v1]− x[v2] + , then the first equation shows that y2k−1 = 0 and
y2k = 1. But from the second equation, we have x[v] = x2k−1 = 0 which contradicts with the assumption
that x[v] > max(x[v1]− x[v2], 0) +  > 0.
If x[v] < min(x[v1]−x[v2], 1)−  ≤ x[v1]−x[v2]− , then by the first equation we have y2k = 0 and
y2k−1 = 1. By the second equation, we have x2k = 0 and x[v] = x2k−1 = 1, contradicting the assumption
that x[v] < min(x[v1]− x[v2], 1)−  ≤ 1−  < 1.
Proof for G< Gates. From (40) and Table 2, we have
x ·B2k−1 − x ·B2k = x ·R2k−1 − x ·R2k = x[v1]− x[v2]
y ·A2k−1 − y ·A2k = y · L2k−1 − y · L2k = y2k − y2k−1
If x[v1] < x[v2]− , then we have y2k−1 = 0 and y2k = 1, from the first equation. But the second equation
implies that x2k = 0 and x[v] = x2k−1 = 1 and thus, x[v] = B 1.
If x[v1] > x[v2] + , then y2k = 0 and y2k−1 = 1 according to the first equation. By the second one we
have x[v] = x2k−1 = 0 and thus, x[v] = B 0.
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Proof for G∨ Gates. From (40) and Table 2, we have
x ·B2k−1 − x ·B2k = x ·R2k−1 − x ·R2k = x[v1] + x[v2]− (1/2)
y ·A2k−1 − y ·A2k = y · L2k−1 − y · L2k = y2k−1 − y2k
If x[v1] = B 1 or x[v2] =

B 1, then x[v1] + x[v2] ≥ 1− . By the first equation y2k = 0 and y2k−1 = 1. By
the second equation, we have x2k = 0 and x[v] = x2k−1 = 1 and thus, x[v] = B 1.
If x[v1] = B 0 and x[v2] =

B 0, then we have x[v1] + x[v2] ≤ 2. From the first equation we must have
y2k−1 = 0 and y2k = 1. Then, the second equation implies x[v] = x2k−1 = 0 and thus, x[v] = B 0.
Proof for G∧ Gates. From (40) and Table 2, we have
x ·B2k−1 − x ·B2k = x ·R2k−1 − x ·R2k = x[v1] + x[v2]− (3/2)
y ·A2k−1 − y ·A2k = y · L2k−1 − y · L2k = y2k−1 − y2k
If x[v1] = B 0 or x[v2] =

B 0, then x[v1] + x[v2] ≤ 1 + . From the first equation, we have y2k−1 = 0 and
y2k = 1. By the second equation, we have x[v] = x2k−1 = 0 and thus, x[v] = B 0.
If x[v1] = B 1 and x[v2] =

B 1, then x[v1] + x[v2] ≥ 2− 2. The first equation shows that y2k = 0 and
y2k−1 = 1. By the second equation, x2k = 0 and x[v] = x2k−1 = 1 and thus, x[v] = B 1.
Proof for G¬ Gates. From (40) and Table 2, we have
x ·B2k−1 − x ·B2k = x ·R2k−1 − x ·R2k = x[v1]− (1− x[v1]) = 2x[v1]− 1
y ·A2k−1 − y ·A2k = y · L2k−1 − y · L2k = y2k − y2k−1
If x[v1] = B 1, then by the first equation, y2k = 0 and y2k−1 = 1. The second one implies x[v] = x2k−1 = 0
and thus, x[v] = B 0. If x[v1] =

B 0, then the first equation implies y2k−1 = 0 and y2k = 1. By the second
equation, we have x2k = 0 and x[v] = x2k−1 = 1 and thus, x[v] = B 1.
8 Conclusions
This paper is a first step towards a systematic understanding of what features make the equilibrium analysis
of markets computationally hard. We introduced the notion of non-monotone utilities, which covers a wide
variety of important utility functions. We then showed that for any family U of non-monotone utilities, it is
PPAD-hard to compute an approximate equilibrium for a market with utilities that are drawn from U or are
linear. Using our general approach, and a further, customized analysis, we resolved the long-standing open
problem on the complexity of CES markets when the parameter ρ is less than−1, showing that for any fixed
value of ρ < −1, the problem of computing an approximate equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
This work raises clearly many questions. First, can we dispense with the linear functions in the general
theorem, i.e., is it true that for any family U of non-monotone utilities, the approximate equilibrium problem
is PPAD-hard for markets that use utilities from U only? For the important class of CES utilities with (any)
ρ < −1, we were able to show this, using a deeper analysis of the class of CES utilities, and appropriate ad-
aptations of the construction. Can a similar approach work in general for all non-monotone utilities?
Second, what other general features of utilities (if any) are there that make the market equilibrium prob-
lem hard? Non-monotonicity is connected with markets that can have disconnected sets of market equilibria
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for which currently we do not have any efficient algorithmic methods to deal with. Convexity has been crit-
ical essentially in all tractable cases so far, whether the set of market equilibria itself is convex or whether a
convex formulation can be obtained after a change of variables.
Most ambitiously, can we obtain a complexity dichotomy theorem that allows us to classify any family
of utility functions (under standard, generally acceptable, mild assumptions for utilities) into those that can
be solved efficiently and those that are apparently intractable (PPAD-hard and/or FIXP-hard)? The present
paper takes a first step towards this goal.
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